Capital structure and agency costs for Norwegian private firms by Thorsen, Sandra Maria Songe & Stabe, Pernille Rypdal
 Sandra Maria Songe Thorsen   
Pernille Rypdal Stabe               
 
 
 
 
Master Thesis  
GRA 19002 
 
 
 
Capital Structure and Agency 
Costs for Norwegian Private Firms 
 
 
 
Supervisor: 
Bogdan Stacescu 
Submission date: 02.09.2013 
 
  
BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo 
Master of Science in Financial Economics 
GRA 19002  02.09.2013 
Page i 
 
Acknowledgements 
We would like to express our deepest gratitude towards our supervisor, Bogdan 
Stacesu. His guidance and extensive knowledge sharing throughout the process of 
writing this master thesis has been invaluable. We highly appreciate his support 
and for making the submission of this master thesis and honour and pleasure. 
 
We would also like to thank the Centre for Corporate Governance Research for 
providing us with the data necessary from the CCGR database.  
 
Last but not least, we would like to express our appreciation to our family and 
friends who have been supportive during the entire master programme at BI. 
 
Thank you, 
Oslo August 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Sandra Maria Songe Thorsen                                       Pernille Rypdal Stabe                   
Sandra_maria7@hotmail.com                                      pernille.stabe@gmail.com 
MSc in Financial Economics                                         MSc in Financial Economics 
 
 
GRA 19002  02.09.2013 
Page ii 
 
Abstract 
This paper is motivated by the developments of capital structure theory, and the 
fact that private firms have been modestly researched in this field. The paper 
examines whether agency costs influence the capital structure of Norwegian 
private firms, and to what extent. The predictions of agency costs are tested for 
firms with dispersed and concentrated ownership structure. This paper finds 
support for the agency theory proposing that firms with dispersed ownership has a 
higher level of leverage than firms with concentrated ownership. However, the 
support of agency theory is not consistent. Instead, the findings support an 
alternative capital structure theory, the pecking order theory.  
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 1.  Introduction 
Capital structure decisions play an important role for corporate finance and 
corporate governance. The potential conflict of interest between different groups 
related to a firm influence capital structure, corporate governance activities and 
investment policies. The costs related to these conflicts might result in inefficient 
managerial decisions and investments that can be categorized as underinvestment 
and overinvestment. These effects will ultimately lead to decrease in firm value.  
 
Over- and underinvestment occurs when not all negative NPV projects are 
rejected and where not all positive NPV projects will be exploited. 
Overinvestment might solely be a product of agency issues, while conflict 
between shareholders and management may only be one of the reasons for 
underinvestment. The managers may be motivated to undertake such decisions as 
it results in greater personal benefits and not necessarily being in the best interest 
of the shareholders. It is assumed throughout the paper that owners are aware of 
over- and underinvestment issues, and use the level of leverage as a means for 
disciplining management. 
 
Motivated by the developments of capital structure theory, this paper examine 
whether, and to what extent, ownership structure and corporate governance are 
linked with the capital structure of Norwegian private firms. In general, these rely 
heavily on debt as a financing resource (Frank and Goyal, 2007). This paper 
investigates whether owners use the level of leverage as a means for disciplining 
management, and whether leverage decreases when ownership concentration 
increases. This negative relationship between leverage and concentration is 
expected because the minority shareholders will have limited control over all 
actions made by management and will therefore use the capital structure to 
influence managers’ behaviour. Entrenchment and other use of free cash flow will 
be limited in line with increasing leverage. Therefore, the more concentrated 
ownership a firm has, the less leverage should be necessary for this particular 
reason.  
 
To investigate agency issues in Norwegian firms, nine hypotheses have been 
tested. The first hypothesis predicts there to be higher leverage for firms without a 
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majority shareholder than the ones with a majority. A greater ownership share 
increases the power of the largest shareholder and enhances the monitoring 
incentives. The need for debt as a disciplining device is therefore less prevalent 
for firms with a majority shareholder. For the remaining hypotheses, the sample is 
split into firms with concentrated ownership and firms with dispersed ownership.  
Four hypotheses are tested on each of the two samples. The second hypothesis 
predicts that in firms with dispersed ownership, leverage is decreasing in the 
share of the largest shareholder. When the largest owner is also the CEO, she will 
have greater power to keep leverage low in order to benefit from higher levels of 
free cash flow. In addition to the low transparency of private firms, this may 
incentivise the CEO to use his power to entrench himself. The third hypothesis is 
therefore to test the prediction that in firms with dispersed ownership, leverage is 
decreasing in the ownership share of the CEO. The fourth hypothesis tested is 
whether there would be an even lower level of leverage when the CEO is the 
largest shareholder as the CEO has full control over the capital structure 
decisions. Leverage may also be lower when there are growth opportunities 
available for the firm. Owners will recognize possibilities to expand and thus 
allow lower leverage in order to exploit some valuable growth opportunities. The 
fifth hypothesis therefore predicts that in firms with dispersed ownership, leverage 
is decreasing in growth opportunities. 
 
In the sample with firms having a majority shareholder, the hypotheses are the 
same as the previous four. However, the story behind these is different. There is a 
controlling shareholder, which means that the problem of not having control over 
management is no longer present. Leverage is expected to decrease with the share 
of the majority shareholder because the majority can increasingly expropriate 
funds from minority shareholders. A form of expropriation is tunnelling and it is 
defined as “the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of their 
controlling shareholders” (Johnson et al.  2000, 1). In addition, when increasing 
debt, the controlling shareholder has less to “steal” from the firm because more of 
the cash flow is bounded for repaying debt holders. Leverage may also decrease 
as a function of growth opportunities. Exploiting these may contribute to value 
maximisation for shareholders. It is therefore included as the ninth and last 
hypothesis. All the hypotheses are built on the premise that private Norwegian 
GRA 19002  02.09.2013 
Page 3 
firms are exposed to agency issues. This can severely destroy firm value and is 
therefore an interesting field of research.  
Alternative explanations for the capital structure will also be examined based on 
theories such as agency costs between shareholders and debt holder, the tradeoff 
theory, and the pecking order theory.  
 
This paper finds some support to the agency theory for Norwegian private firms. 
Firms with dispersed ownership have higher leverage than firms with 
concentrated ownership. It also finds the leverage is decreasing with growth 
opportunities when firms have dispersed ownership structure. Furthermore, 
leverage is decreasing with ownership share in the concentrated ownership 
sample. However, the paper finds stronger and more persistent support for the 
pecking order theory on capital structure. 
 
Private firms are much less researched than public firms, hence this thesis will 
give a comparative advantage by exploring this field. Public firms are widely used 
for a large number of articles, but very few have analysed private firms from a 
corporate finance and corporate governance perspective. This is despite the fact 
that 90 percent of firms are private (Bøhren, 2012). Due to regulations, these firms 
are not obligated to provide all of the same information as public firms. It is 
therefore scarce data on private firms. Relative to other countries, Scandinavia 
keep quite good records of private firms making it possible to do research on 
these. In particular, for this thesis, data is provided by the CCGR database 
constructed by the Centre for Corporate Governance Research. The database 
contains corporate governance data and accounting data for both public and 
private Norwegian firms.  
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows; in section two a literature review 
provides the main findings in context of optimal capital structure. The focus here 
is on the agency theory, and ownership structure, alternative theories are 
supplemented in section three. The paper introduces the hypotheses followed by 
the description of the data selection and the variables in section four. Section five 
elaborates on the methodology of this paper leading up to section six which 
presents the results.  Finally, the paper concludes in section seven.   
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Capital Structure 
Ever since Modigliani and Miller (1958) argued that the market value of any firm 
is independent of its capital structure, capital structure has been a popular field of 
research. In essence, Modigliani and Miller proposed that capital structure was 
irrelevant for the value of the firm. This has become known as M&M proposition 
I. It builds on rather rigid assumptions that are not compatible with the real world, 
such as: no taxes, no transaction costs, no bankruptcy cost, symmetry of market 
information, and same borrowing rate for individuals and firms. Due to the 
unrealistic nature of these assumptions, they later created the stepping-stone for 
future advances in this field. M&M´s view on “optimal” capital structure changed 
when they relaxed the assumption of no taxes. They relaxed this assumption in 
their 1963 paper and found that firm value was maximized when entirely financed 
with debt. This was due to the tax advantage of debt, known as tax shield. 
However, they did not include important factors such as; bankruptcy costs, 
personal taxes (although Miller published a paper including personal taxes in 
“Debt and Taxes” in 1977) or agency costs. Agency costs can be defined by 
“representing the difference between the value of an actual firm and the value of a 
hypothetical firm which would exist in a more perfect world where the incentives 
of the managers and the shareholders are perfectly aligned”(Grinblatt and Titman 
2002, 645). 
2.2 Agency Theory between Managers and Owners 
In 1776 Adam Smith expressed how one takes better care of one’s own money 
than anyone else’s money. This statement might be considered the first approach 
towards agency theory. Nonetheless, Jensen and Meckling formalized the actual 
principal-agent theory in 1976, which became the foundation for modern agency 
theory within the organization (Goergen, 2012). 
 
Separation of ownership and control within firms creates the foundation for 
potential agency costs. Berle and Means outlined this in 1932 in their book “The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property”, arguing that managerial discretion 
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increases with the dispersion of ownership. When the manager (agent) of a firm is 
not the owner (principal) of the same firm, she does not “bear a substantial share 
of the wealth effects of their decisions” (Fama and Jensen, 1983). This implies 
that the manager may have incentives other than the owners concerning financing 
and investments, as these decisions affects the managers differently than the 
owners. Hence, maximizing shareholders’ wealth is not always top priority of the 
manager.  Agency costs consist of three components; monitoring costs, bonding 
costs, and residual loss. Monitoring is observing agents behaviour, but also taking 
action to limit or avoid unwanted behaviour. Bonding costs is borne by the agent; 
it acts as a signal to the principal that the agent will in fact act in their best 
interest. Finally, the principal incurs the residual loss because the agent may not 
invest in a way that maximizes the principal’s wealth (Goergen, 2012). The 
agency costs may be more severe in firms with less transparency. Due to the 
nature of private firms, they are less transparent than listed firms. When there is 
little transparency managers have the ability to entrench himself with less 
probability of being detected.  
 
The free cash flow problem introduced by Michael Jensen in 1986 was 
fundamental to the understanding of how managers were enabled to deviate from 
maximizing shareholders wealth. The free cash flow theory argues that the 
incentives and interests of managers and shareholders conflicts over the payment 
of free cash flow to shareholders. In order to prevent managers from taking 
advantage of free cash flow for personal benefits, the resources under managers’ 
control should be limited. Jensen states that free cash flow is the number one 
financing source of agency problems. Although this paper will not focus directly 
on the free cash flow theory, it  
will do so indirectly in order to explain some of the conflict of interest that 
evolves between managers and owners.   
 
2.3 Ownership Concentration 
The benefits of high ownership concentration for private firms are closer 
monitoring and less free riding. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) monitoring increases when the ownership concentration 
increases. They are incentivised by higher gains from higher firm value when 
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owning more. Additionally, their impact of voting on the annual general meeting 
(AGM) is increasing with ownership fraction, giving higher power to shareholders 
with more shares. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986) there will be less free 
riding when ownership concentration is high, as active governance will give less 
benefit to passive owners. There is a fixed cost of being active, such as time 
consumption. However, the benefits of being active increases with ownership 
share.  
 
The costs of high concentration constitute i.e. majority-minority shareholder 
conflicts and problems with incompetent owners (common for second-generation 
family firms), which is why many firms have dispersed ownership. Majority-
minority conflicts between owners arise when powerful owners over-consume, 
overinvest, and create private benefits through tunnelling mechanism. Tunnelling 
is defined as “the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of their 
controlling shareholders” (Johnson et al., 2000, 1). High concentration gives high 
power to the largest owners who may not be suited or competent in optimal 
decision-making on behalf of the firm (Burkart et al., 1997). 
  
2.4 Underinvestment and overinvestment problem  
Financing and investment decisions are not independent in imperfect capital 
markets. Actually, imperfections in the capital market, such as asymmetric 
information, where one party has more information than the other party, and 
agency costs, might induce over- and underinvestment. This indicates that not all 
positive net present value (NPV) projects will be exploited (underinvestment) nor 
will all negative NPV projects be rejected (overinvestment). Asymmetric 
information between managers and shareholders may contribute to conflicts of 
interest and encourage overinvestments or underinvestments (Morgado and 
Pindado, 2003).  
Exploiting positive NPV projects should be advocated whereas investing in 
negative NPV projects should be discouraged. In 1990, René M. Stulz wrote 
“Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies” in which he further 
discusses the overinvestment and underinvestment issues. He suggests that there 
is an optimal financing policy where there is a trade-off between the costs and 
benefits of debt. The optimum therefore lies between underinvestment and 
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overinvestment. According to Stulz, underinvestment may occur as debt payments 
force management to pay out cash flow instead of investing in positive NPV 
projects. He assumes that managers value investment because their perquisites 
increase with investment, even when the firm invests in negative NPV projects. 
Supported by Jensen (1986), free cash flow creates incentive for managers to 
overinvest, whereas debt makes managers pay out cash and therefore limits 
overinvestment. Consequently investment in all states of the world is reduced – 
reducing overinvestment while increasing the probability of underinvestment. 
Hence, debt impacts shareholders positively by reducing overinvestment and 
negatively by amplifying the underinvestment problem. Due to these problems, 
shareholders may use debt as a governance mechanism, as a way to discipline 
managers. 
 
2.5 Debt as a Governance Mechanism 
Imposing debt requirements on the firm means that managers are less able to take 
cash out of the firm for personal usage as the firm is financially constrained to 
repay creditors in the future. The managers therefore have to focus on generating 
future cash flow in order to prevent illiquidity and threat of bankruptcy. A possible 
liquidation process would imply a shift of the controlling hands to the creditors. 
Creditors’ incentives of the firm’s future differs from that by shareholders as they 
only worry about receiving as much as possible back, rather than keeping the firm 
as an going concern. Therefore, the debt should be set at a level that encourages 
managers to enter positive NPV projects and continue to finance existing ones, as 
this is the firms’ livelihood (Tirole, 2006). 
 
2.6  Alternative Theories of Capital Structure 
 
2.6.1  Agency Theory Between Shareholders and Debt holders 
Shareholders may have an incentive to maximize the value of their shares instead 
of the total value of the firm’s debt and equity. This becomes evident when firms 
have debt in their capital structure. In other words, firms make different decisions 
for maximizing wealth when financed not only with equity.  If the firm is equity 
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financed it will resort to less risky projects (Grinblatt and Titman, 2002). In AS 
and ASA private firms, shareholders’ limited liability form the basis for the firm’s 
preference for risky investments as higher risk should provide higher expected 
return. Gains will benefit managers and shareholders, while potential losses will 
be borne by debt holders. Substituting safer assets for risky assets, after debt is 
granted, is an agency problem known as the asset substitution problem (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976).  It is also known as overinvestment.  
 
There is no debt contract that can control for all possible future events, thus no 
perfect contract can be written to prevent agency issues. However, if debtors are 
rational they will suspect there to be an assets substitution problem and so 
increase the interest rates on the loans. The debt contracts may therefore limit the 
firms in making investments, causing underinvestment problems. Another aspect 
of the underinvestment problem is presented by Stewart Myers (1977), as the debt 
overhang problem. In this case, debt made in previous periods limit the free cash 
flow that would be necessary in order to exploit positive NPV projects available. 
 
2.6.2 Tradeoff Theory 
The static tradeoff theory is based on the Modigliani-Miller theorem (1963), 
which has been developed to determine an optimal capital structure. It takes into 
account market imperfections such as bankruptcy cost of debt, agency costs and 
taxes. Kraus and Litzenberg (1973) propose it to be a balance between the 
deadweight loss of bankruptcy and the tax shield benefit of debt, disadvantage and 
benefit from leveraging. When debt to equity ratio increases, marginal benefit of 
tax and marginal cost of bankruptcy should get to an optimal point. The tradeoff 
theory proposed by Kraus and Litzenberg is the classical version, while it has later 
been extended further by among others Jensen and Meckling in 1976. Tax benefits 
are not so prevalent, whereas agency cost has been included as cost to debt. The 
effect of agency costs may increase or decrease the level of debt. In the case of too 
much equity the result may be the free cash flow problem mentioned above, and 
conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. Too high debt level may 
result in asset substitution, overinvestment, and conflict of interest between 
shareholders and bondholders (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). However, a static target 
debt level is rather impossible to hold for any circumstances. Firms are to various 
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degree financially constrained which affect the debt level. Therefore the theory 
argues that there are variables that need to be included when determining the 
target debt level of a firm, i.e. profitability, tangibility, size, growth opportunity. 
For example, a firm with high profitability and a solid level of tangible assets will 
usually have a higher target debt ratio. As the firm has collateral to offer as a 
security on the debt, the cost of debt is less than a firm with little collateral. 
Therefore, trade off theory suggests a positive relationship between profitability 
and leverage (Fama and French, 2002). 
 
2.6.3  Pecking Order Theory 
Another theory of capital structure is the pecking order theory. It is developed by 
Myers (1984), arguing that a firm follows a pecking order if it prefers internal to 
external financing and debt to equity if it is to use external financing. The reason 
is that managers have more information about the firm and its prospects than 
outside investors. Being aware of this, the outside investors require compensation, 
a discount in share prices, for the asymmetric information.  Hence raising external 
funds is costly which is why managers avoid this form for fund raising if possible. 
The name of the theory comes from the order of desired financing methods of a 
firm: internal funds from retained earnings, riskless debt, risky debt and finally 
equity issue. Moreover, this theory considers managers’ vision of financial 
flexibility and its effect on firms’ leverage. In tough periods, having internal funds 
or excess reserves gives the managers flexibility in the sense of financial decision 
making. Furthermore, it makes firms less dependent on paying back claims or 
making new expensive loans. Hence, firms remain flexible in the sense of 
minimizing interest obligations in order to avoid shrinking their business in 
economic downturn (Graham and Harvey, 2001).   
The pecking order theory will therefore be supported if there is a negative 
relationship between performance and leverage. This is because firms would not 
take on debt if internal funds were generated. 
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3. Hypotheses 
In this section nine hypotheses are presented and explained. They are all built on 
the premise that private Norwegian firms are exposed to agency problems.  
 
According to the agency theory, debt has the advantage of reducing the principal-
agent problem between owners and managers. Leverage can be used to limit 
managerial overinvestment. On the contrary, if leverage is too high it can lead to 
debt overhang, and thus underinvestment. Owners would ideally set capital 
structure such that there is an optimum level of investment, the level that avoids 
both under and overinvestment. Owners with a low ownership share have less 
power over management and will have higher incentive to use debt as a 
disciplining device. As a result it is expected that leverage is higher in firms with 
dispersed ownership. Since private firms rely heavily on debt financing, this paper 
commences the research by testing whether leverage changes with the ownership 
concentration. The first hypothesis is as follows:  
 
H1: Firms with dispersed ownership have higher leverage than firms with a 
majority shareholder. 
 
A greater ownership share increases the power of the largest shareholder and 
enhances monitoring incentives. With increased power, shareholders can better 
monitor the investment decisions by management. Debt is therefore less important 
as a governance mechanism. For that reason, leverage is expected to decrease. To 
test this, the sample is split into firms with dispersed and concentrated ownership 
structure.  
 
H2a: In firms with dispersed ownership, leverage is decreasing in the share of the 
largest shareholder. 
 
When the largest owner is also the CEO, she will have greater power to keep 
leverage low in order to benefit from higher levels of free cash flow. In addition to 
the low transparency of private firms, this may incentivise the CEO to use his 
power to enjoy perquisites, also called the entrenchment effect.  
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H2b: In firms with dispersed ownership, leverage is decreasing in the ownership 
share of the CEO. 
 
H2c: In firms with dispersed ownership, even lower leverage is expected when the 
largest shareholder is also the CEO.  
 
Hypothesis one propose that with dispersed ownership leverage is higher. 
However, when firms with dispersed ownership have growth opportunities these 
may be taken advantage of and leverage will decrease. This is due to the fact that 
the firm uses the free cash flow on new investments. Shareholders are willing to 
exploit growth opportunities that they believe will increase their wealth. Debt is 
therefore less needed a as a disciplinary device on managers. On the other hand, 
when debt is substantially high, investment opportunities may not be taken 
advantage of due to debt overhang. Lower leverage may therefore be beneficial 
when growth opportunities are present.  
 
H3: In firms with dispersed ownership, leverage is decreasing in growth 
opportunities. 
 
So far the sample with dispersed ownership is examined, and the same hypotheses 
in the sample with concentrated ownership will be examined. The assumptions 
above apply for concentrated ownership as well: a greater ownership share 
increases the power of the largest shareholder and enhances monitoring 
incentives. Also, the managers’ incentives will more or less be aligned with that of 
shareholders. However, the story behind these hypotheses is different. There is a 
controlling shareholder, which means that the problem of not having control over 
management is no longer present. Leverage is expected to decrease with the share 
of the majority shareholder because she can increasingly expropriate funds from 
minority shareholders. In addition, when increasing debt, the controlling 
shareholder has less to “steal” from the firm because more of the cash flow goes 
to paying the debt holders.  
 
H4a: In firms with concentrated ownership, leverage is decreasing in the share of 
the largest shareholder. 
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When the CEO has an ownership share in the firm, leverage is expected to 
decrease. This is because the CEO will have greater power to limit leverage. 
When the CEO is also the majority shareholder she will have full control over 
capital structure and therefore leverage is expected to be even lower.  
 
H4b: In firms with concentrated ownership, leverage is decreasing in the 
ownership share of the CEO. 
 
H4c: In firms with concentrated ownership, leverage is even lower when the 
largest owner is also the CEO.  
 
Leverage may also decrease as a function of growth opportunities.  Exploiting 
growth opportunities may contribute to value maximisation for shareholders 
which may relax the use of leverage as a controlling device. This leads to the final 
hypothesis. 
H5: In firms with concentrated ownership, leverage is decreasing in growth 
opportunities. 
 
4. Description of Data and Variables 
4.1 Description of Data 
The Centre for Corporate Governance Research provides data from the CCGR 
database. This is a unique database containing corporate governance related data 
and accounting data for private Norwegian firms.  
 
The CCGR database contains standardized yearly accounting data of all 
Norwegian private firms.  The period that will be analysed in this thesis is 2006-
2011. Because of the 2006 tax reform, that changed the dataset substantially, this 
paper starts with the accounting year of 2006. The dataset used in this study 
includes only non-utility and non-financial private firms, filtered to include only 
AS and ASA registered firms. Non-operating firms is filter out from the sample as 
these might be set up primarily for tax advantages only, and is expected to be an 
increase of these firms particularly after the new tax reform in Norway in 2006. In 
order to exclude the non-operating firms, firms with total assets less than 
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10 000 000 NOK are filter out which additionally excludes firms that are 
generally small in size. Some descriptive statistics of the sample are given in 
Table 3. Additionally, all negative observations on liabilities to financial 
institutions are excluded as these are considered unrealistic observations. This also 
goes for negative revenues, zero revenues for all years, and ownership percentage 
above 100percent.  In order to separate majority ownership from minority dummy 
variables are used, 1 for ownership concentration above 50 percent and 0 for less 
than and equal to 50 percent.  
The final sample consists of 170364 observations (firm-years), where 
90724 are considered concentrated and 73281 dispersed. Table 1 in appendix 
presents the number of firms and descriptive statistics over the six consecutive 
years. The industry sectors codes defined in the data sets can be found in Table 2 
in the appendix.  
4.2 Variables 
The variables obtained from the CCGR database are presented in appendix. In the 
proceeding section follows an elaboration of the variables (leverage, growth 
opportunities, and ownership concentration) and control variables (tangibility, 
performance, firm size, liquidity, and industry dummies).  
 
Capital structure is the dependent variable in this study and represented by 
“Leverage”. It is measured as the ratio of Debt to Total Assets, where debt is the 
sum of long- and short-term liabilities to financial institutions. Since the database 
consists of accounting data, all values are book values. Revenues over total assets 
as a proxy for growth opportunity is therefore use instead of the usual Tobin’s Q.   
Trade credit is kept separated from leverage, meaning holding accounts payable 
and accounts receivable distinct from debt and assets.  
 
         
                                                                                       
            
 
According to Myers’ (1977) firm value is made up of assets in place and growth 
opportunities. This paper uses Revenue over Total Assets as a proxy for growth 
opportunities. The value of growth opportunities depends on investments made by 
the managers. Brito and John (2002) concluded that growth opportunities which 
have not yet been taken advantage of has a considerably effect on agency costs of 
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debt. Firms in mature sectors with low future growth opportunities and with high 
leverage are often subject to overinvestment in risky projects. On the contrary, 
firms with good economic prospects are motivated to underinvestment and to 
avoid overly risky investments. Industries in which the opportunities for asset 
substitution are more limited will have higher debt levels. For example firms in 
mature industries with few growth opportunities will be more highly levered. 
Firms where slow or negative growth is optimal, and with large cash inflows from 
operations should have more debt (Raviv and Harris, 1991). This is because large 
cash inflows without future investment options facilitates actions such as 
consuming perquisites or build empires by managers. Jensen (1989) identified 
industries with these characteristics as steel, chemicals, tobacco, television and 
radio broadcasting, and wood and paper products. 
                   
       
            
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) there is a negative relation between 
ownership concentration and debt since firms with concentrated ownership 
structure will hesitate to take on excess debt if it introduces greater monitoring 
because there will be additional debt holders that will have interest in the firms 
operations. The variable used to measure the ownership concentration is the sum 
percent of equity held by the owner with rank 1, and divided by 100 to get a 
comparable ratio. The ownership concentration is measured by using variables 
based on ultimate ownership and not direct ownership. An ultimate owner may 
not own a firm directly but has an ownership through another firm.  
 
                       
                                 
   
 
Tangibility represents collateral and is measured as total fixed assets over total 
assets. According to Harris and Raviv (1991) and Myers and Majluf (1984), 
leverage is positively related to tangibility (fixed assets). The greater the 
tangibility the lower is the debt rate offered the firm as it can issue debt secured 
by the firm’s  property which has known values. 
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The return on assets (ROA), Operating Income over Total Assets, is used as a 
proxy for performance. Titman and Wessels (1988) found that firms prefer to use 
internal funds if available. Firms with high earnings rate would maintain relatively 
low debt levels because of its ability to finance itself from internally generated 
funds. They prefer to remain flexible in the sense of minimizing interest 
obligations in order to avoid shrinking their business in economic downturn 
(Graham and Harvey, 2001). This indicates a negative relationship between 
performance and debt ratio. Tradeoff theory predicts a positive relationship to 
debt levels. Performance would have a positive relationship with leverage based 
on the same argumentation as for collateral, reducing debt rates promoting the use 
of debt. However, this does not seem to hold in practice. 
            
                
            
 
Additionally, firm size is often argued to have a positive relationship with 
leverage. Size is measured by the logarithm of the book value of revenue. It is 
argued that large firms have better access to capital markets (Ozkan, 2002), fewer 
growth opportunities (Kim, Mauer and Stohs, 1995), are more diversified, and 
have lower probability of being financial distressed, i.e. lower expected 
bankruptcy costs (Rajan and Zingale, 1995) , more possibilities to publish 
information about themselves (Scherr and Hulburt, 2001), as well as more 
collateral (Ozkan, 2002).  
                    
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Wruck (2002), concluded that liquidity is an important 
determinant of capital structure, as it affects the expected costs of financial 
distress and expected agency costs. It is expected to be a relationship between 
liquidity and leverage, hence a liquidity variable is therefore constructed as a 
control variable to account for this effect. Research including asset liquidity faces 
difficulties of measuring the liquidity of assets (Sibilkov, 2007). Both the current 
assets over current liabilities (current ratio) and current assets over total assets are 
used as proxy for liquidity (named proportion of liquid assets). Current ratio is 
frequently used and is appropriate for private firms. However, this proxy for 
liquidity reduces the number of observation substantially. The second proxy 
replaces the former as it increases the number of observation. Morellec (2001) 
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predicts a positive relation between asset liquidity and leverage when assets serve 
as collateral for debt contracts and when managers have no discretion over those 
assets. A negative relation between asset liquidity and leverage is predicted when 
the assets are not for collateral. However, the rational for a positive effect of 
liquidity on leverage is based on the idea that illiquid assets are more costly and 
timely to sell, and therefore the cost of liquidation, bankruptcy and debt will 
increase. Thus, firms that are less liquid reduce their probability of default by 
reducing leverage. Models that predict a negative effect argue that illiquidity 
makes it more expensive to expropriate from debt holders, which reduces the cost 
of debt, and firms then take up more debt.  
              
              
                   
 
                            
              
            
 
 
Two dummy variables are also included in the regressions; a dummy for the CEO 
being the majority shareholder and a dummy for a firm having only one owner.  
 
According to Harris and Raviv (1991) firms within the same industry are more 
similar than firms across industries, as firms within an industry share common 
factors. As firms in high leverage industry have higher leverage, accounting for 
industry effects is necessary (Frank and Goyal, 2009).  Industry effect will 
therefore be measured by sector dummies according to the Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) codes (Table 3 in Appendix) 9 industry dummies are used for 
classifying the firms into 9 different industry sectors in addition to keeping 0 as a 
reference group for firms missing an industry sector. In order to avoid correlation 
among the residuals, the dummies are added to the regression, and where the 
intercept is excluded in order to avoid perfect correlation with the dummies. 
Table 1 below displays the industry codes for the sample. 
 
The control variables like tangibility, performance size and liquidity is used for 
supporting tradeoff and pecking order theory if present in the regression results. 
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Table 1: Industry Dummies 
This table includes all industry dummies used in all the regressions. It shows what sector each 
dummy represents, how many firms there is for each, how many percent of the total firms, and the 
standard industry classification code (SIC) it entails.  
Industry 
Dummies Sector Name SIC  Number  No. of firms % firms 
Id_1 
Basic agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
mining and oil 1+2+3+4 
 
5306 
 
3,39 
Id_2 Light industry 5 5357 3,43 
Id_3 Heavy industry 6 8932 5,71 
Id_4 Retail and wholesale 9 27583 17,63 
Id_5 Building 8 14119 9,03 
Id_6 Transport 10 9516 6,08 
Id_7 Tourism 11 2686 1,72 
Id_8 Publishing &Media,IT, Real Estate, 
Services, Gambling 
12+14+15+17 82919 53,01 
Total 156418 100 
 
 
 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics, Analysis of Variance and Variance Inflation Factor  
This section presents the most relevant descriptive statistics, analysis of variance 
and variance inflation factors (VIF). Table 2 outlines the descriptive statistics for 
the main variables for the full sample. Year by year descriptive statistics are 
included in the appendix (Table 1). Figure 1 shows the distribution of the 
ownership variable. Table 3 display correlations between all the main variables 
and some variables that are used to construct a main variable. The table contains 
two correlation matrices, one with the old measure for liquidity (current ratio) and 
the other with the proportion of liquid assets.  Table 4 display the number of 
observations for each variable in the entire sample and two subsamples. Table 2 
in the appendix provides a test of the three assumptions for Anova. Table 5 
outlines the mean and the median for all the main variables and the Anova F-test. 
Table 6 displays the VIF’s for the main variables used in the regressions and 
VIF’s including the current ratio. 
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4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
This table shows the main statistical measures for the main variables used in the regression 
analysis. It is for the full sample. N is the number of observations. 
 
CEO ownership GO Leverage Liquidity Ownership Performance Revenue Size Tangibility 
 Mean 0,60 0,90 0,13 0,73 0,64 0,07 48638157 16,75 0,23 
 Median 0,51 0,08 0,00 0,93 0,57 0,04 2111000 17,19 0,08 
 Maximum 1,00 6,96 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,97 1,06E+09 20,79 1,00 
 Minimum 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -1,23 0 9,74 0,00 
 Std, Dev, 0,34 1,32 0,24 0,34 0,31 0,15 1,4E+08 2,14 0,29 
 N 31830 163418 163418 163418 163418 163418 163418 96458 96458 
 
 
In Table 2 is the statistical measures; mean, median, maximum, minimum, 
number of observations and standard deviation. Mean and median should not 
deviate substantially from each other when there is normal distribution of the data. 
Most variables exhibit this, however the growth opportunity (GO) and tangibility 
is deviating somewhat. The variables have been winsorized to deal with this. Max 
and min defines the range of each variable. This is particularly important for 
leverage and ownership variables as these shouldn’t deviate from the range 0-1. 
Standard deviation shows the variation away from the mean. All the variables 
have low standard deviation.  
Except from CEO ownership, all variables have a large number of observations. 
Therefore, when using the CEO series in the regressions, this is important to keep 
in mind as it can make the results insignificant if there is too few observations. 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of ownership 
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Figure 1 is included to give a visual understanding of the skewed distribution of 
ownership. The number of single owners is significantly bigger than for any 
number of owners. Around 55 000 firms have only one owner. This has been 
taken into account as regressions are including a dummy for these single owners. 
Including such a dummy would prevent the results to be driven by this factor.  
 
Table 6: Correlation 
Table 3: Correlation Matrices 
The top matrix includes the portion of liquid assets as a measure for liquidity, while the bottom uses the current ratio. 
All main variables are included as well as operating income and revenue as these form the basis for some of the 
main variables. 
 
 
 
  
CEO    
Ownership 
Leverage Liquidity 
Op.     
income 
Ownership     
Performance 
(ROA) 
Revenue Size GO Tangibility 
CEO Ownership 1,00 
        
 
Leverage 0,07 1,00 
       
 
Liquidity -0,07 -0,56 1,00 
      
 
Operating income -0,05 -0,10 0,07 1,00 
     
 
Ownership share 0,59 0,02 -0,01 -0,04 1,00 
    
 
Performance (ROA) -0,04 -0,22 0,15 0,40 -0,07 1,00 
   
 
Revenue -0,18 -0,14 0,19 0,31 -0,08 0,10 1,00 
  
 
Size -0,18 -0,17 0,28 0,19 -0,11 0,27 0,57 1,00 
 
 
GO -0,12 -0,23 0,33 0,05 -0,06 0,24 0,51 0,70 1,00  
Tangibility 0,07 0,55 -1,00 -0,07 0,00 -0,15 -0,19 -0,28 -0,33 1,00 
 
  
CEO    
Ownership 
Leverage Liquidity 
Operating     
income 
Ownership    
share 
Performance 
(ROA) 
Revenue Size Tangibility GO 
CEO Ownership 1,00 
         Leverage 0,09 1,00 
        Liquidity 0,00 -0,11 1,00 
       Operating income -0,05 -0,06 0,00 1,00 
      Ownership share  0,84  0,05 0,00 -0,05 1,00 
     Performance (ROA) -0,06 -0,17 0,03 0,27 -0,06 1,00 
    Revenue -0,20 -0,12 -0,01 0,15 -0,17 0,10 1,00 
   Size -0,23 -0,13 -0,03 0,09 -0,20 0,22 0,55 1,00 
  Tangibility 0,08 0,42 -0,04 -0,03 0,05 -0,05 -0,16 -0,17    1,00 
 GO -0,15 -0,21 -0,01 0,01 -0,13 0,19 0,48 0,69   -0,28 1,00 
 
Table 3 displays the correlation matrix for the variables included in the regression 
as well as a matrix with the current ratio as a liquidity proxy. The current ratio 
doesn’t have high correlation with any of the other variables, it does however 
have very few observations relative to the other variables used. The new measure 
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for liquidity has perfect negative correlation with tangibility. Tangibility is 
therefore excluded from the regressions.  
The highest correlation is between, ownership share and CEO ownership share. 
However, these two variables are not used in the same regression. The second 
largest correlation is between GO and size. Its 0,70 and is the larges accepted 
value for positive correlation between variables used in the same regression. To 
make sure these two can be included together in a regression the Variance 
Inflation Factor was calculated, and was below the threshold for multicollinearity 
(Table 7) 
 
                                             Table 4:  Number of observations for each variable in three samples        
Variable        Dispersed          Concentrated                All 
Revenue 73013 90405 163418 
Growth Opportunity 73013 90405 163418 
Tangibility 43298 53160 96458 
Performance 73013 90405 163418 
Ownership 73013 90405 163418 
Liquidity (Current Ratio) 10288 11662 21950 
Proportion of Liquid Assets 73013 90405 163418 
CEO Ownership 12952 18878 31830 
Leverage 73013 90405 163418 
 
Table 4 outlines the number of firms in the dispersed, the concentrated ownership 
structure sample, and full sample for all years. This is important to check as a 
large full sample may look sufficient while for the regressions using only a 
subsample may be compromised if the difference is large. The samples are not 
significantly larger for any of the variables. In the appendix, there is a year by 
year count of each variable confirming that there is no significant difference in the 
subsamples across years.  
 
4.3.2 Analysis of Variance 
This section analyses the variance of the mean and median between the two 
groups concentrated and dispersed ownership structure. ANOVA is used for 
testing the variance of means between the two group whereas Kruskal-Wallis is 
used for testing the median. 
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Table 5:  Analysis of variance test (ANOVA) 
This table shows all the main variables’ mean and median and the p-values for both Anova F-test 
and the Kruskal-Wallis Test.  
 
  
Total Concentrated Dispersed Difference ANOVA's  
F-test 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
Test 
Variables Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median    p-value 
  
  p-value 
Leverage 0,13 0,00 0,12 0,00 0,15 0,00 -0,04 0,00 0,000 0,000  
Revneue 48638k 2111k 54402k 1840k 41501088 2485k 12901k -645k 0,000 0,003 
GO 0,90 0,08 0,91 0,07 0,90 0,09 0,01 -0,02 0,061 0,090  
Tangibility 0,23 0,08 0,22 0,08 0,23 0,08 -0,01 -0,01 0,000 0,000 
Performance 0,07 0,04 0,06 0,03 0,07 0,04 -0,01 -0,01 0,000 0,000 
Ownership 0,64 0,57 0,88 1,00 0,34 0,34 0,54 0,66 0,000 0,000 
Liquidity 356,41 7,25 367,40 7,39 343,95 7,12 23,45 0,26 0,575 0,002 
CEO Ownership 0,60 0,51 0,80 1,00 0,31 0,33 0,49 0,67 0,000 0,000 
 
When analyzing the difference in mean the one-way ANOVA's F test is utilized. 
The null hypothesis for the test is that there is no difference between the two 
samples. Table 5 displays the variable statistics, for which the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected for Growth Opportunities and Liquidity. For the remaining 
variables it can be concluded that there is a statistical significant difference 
between the two groups. However, there are three assumptions underlying the 
ANOVA test that must be met to ensure the validity of the analysis and the power 
of the test. The following three assumptions have been check in this study and for 
which the results are presented in Table 2 in the Appendix: 1) Homogeneity of 
variance; 2) Normally distributed errors; 3) Independent error terms. Only 
assumption three is satisfied. As two out of three assumptions are not met, the 
chances are high for incorrectly rejecting the null hypotheses. Probably the most 
important explanation for why the first two assumptions failed is the inequality in 
sample sizes between the two groups, and also because the panel data is 
unbalanced. 
 
 Since the median is less sensitive to outliers than the mean, the equality test of 
the median is run, the Kruskal-Wallis test. It is a non-parametric ANOVA test, 
making no assumptions about normality. This assumption is made in the ANOVA 
test, which can provide inaccurate p-values when the data is far from being 
normally distributed.  The null hypothesis for Kruskal-Wallis test is that there is 
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no difference between the median of the two groups, concentrated and dispersed 
ownership. From the results displayed in Table 5, all variables are rejected except 
from Growth Opportunity which cannot be reject. This means that the median of 
Growth Opportunity is not statistically significantly different between the two 
groups.  
 
4.3.3 Variance Inflation Factor 
Table 6 : Variance Inflation Ratio 
When the VIF coefficient is below 5, there is no evidence of multicollinearity.  The first result 
table includes Current Ratio as proxy for Liquidity. The second result table includes the second 
proxy for Liquidity, Proportion of Liquid Assets. However, the VIF result for Proportion of Liquid 
Assets excludes Tangibility which is why it has an acceptable value below the VIF threshold. 
Explanatory Variables (w/current ratio)                              VIF 
Size 2,00 
Growth Opportunity 2,01 
Tangibility 1,09 
Performance 1,06 
Ownership 3,44 
Current Ratio 1,00 
CEO Ownership 3,51 
 
Explanatory Variables (w/proportion of liquid assets) 
                             VIF 
Size 2,53 
Growth Opportunity 2,21 
Tangibility 39915943 
Performance 1,19 
Ownership 1,00 
Portion of liquid assets 1,08 
CEO Ownership 1,02 
 
The presence of multicollinearity within a set of explanatory variables can make 
interpreting the significance of the individual variables in a regression model 
difficult. In order to measure the degree of multicollinearity in the regressions the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is used.  The VIF is measuring to what extent a 
variable is affecting the standard error in the regression. If significant 
multicollinearity is present the VIF will be large for the inflated variable (O’Brien, 
2007). Because of this significance, it is possible to have a relatively large Ri
2 
although the independent variable is not statistically significant. Hence, it is 
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important to adjust the model if there is evidence for multicollinearity. Equation 5 
below has been used to calculate all pairs of explanatory variables, where Ri
2 is 
the goodness of fit for the ith explanatory variable. 
   
       
 
      
                                  (5) 
  
The threshold of multicollinearity has been set to the level of VIF at 5. Table 6 
shows the results from the explanatory variables. There is no evidence of strong 
multicollinearity among the variables except from Tangibility in the second VIF 
measurement. The correlation matrix shows that the multicollinarity is likely to be 
a result from the perfectly negative relationship between tangibility and the 
proportion of liquid assets as a proxy for liquidity. The reason why proportion of 
liquid assets has a low value presented in the VIF results is that liquidity is 
excluded in this measurement. This is also the case when testing the hypotheses 
using regression with proportion of liquid assets as proxy for liquidity.  
 
 
5. Methodology  
This section will thoroughly explain the steps performed for this thesis. From 
receiving the raw data from the CCGR database to running the regressions. The 
reason for being particularly detailed is that it will be useful for further research 
using this database. It might shorten the data handling time for any future 
analysis.  
5.1 Data handling and regression equations 
In excel the data is filtered for negative liabilities, utility and financial firms are 
excluded, and the non-readable missing values are replaced by #NA. Then the 
data series are imported into Eviews for further filtering and estimation purposes. 
The sample is filtered for firms with zero revenue in all six years. Descriptive 
statistics are estimated in order to observe any outliers that would potentially drive 
the results. In addition, the number of observations for each variable is displayed 
from the descriptive statistics which also facilitates the comparison between the 
whole sample and the two subsamples. The covariance matrix is produced in 
Eviews making it possible to detect any multicollinearity problems.  
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To handle extreme outliers winsorization is applied. Winsorization is a 
transformation method in which outliers are replaced with a threshold quintile 
value. The reason for choosing this method is to avoid micromanaging at a case-
by-case basis, and rather treat the outliers with an arms-length approach. The 
quintile values chosen are 0.01 percent, 0.05 percent and 0.1 percent. For 
example, the maximum and minimum 0.1 percent observations are deleted from 
series included in the regressions. Depending on the amount of outliers, different 
values were used on the different variables. 0.01 percent was used on firm Size, 
0.05 percent on Growth Opportunity and 0.1 percent was used for the other 
variables.  
 
The data is structured as an unbalanced panel, it is therefore necessary to identify 
both a group ID reference and a cell ID reference for Eviews to register it as a 
panel. The group ID is the firm ID series, and the cell ID is the year series.  
 
To test the first hypothesis, the whole sample of firms is used (concentrated and 
dispersed ownership). The dependent variable is leverage and the main 
independent variable is a dummy for ownership concentration. To control for 
various effects, firm size, growth opportunities, industry effects, tangibility, firm 
performance and liquidity, are included. This is elaborated in section 4. 
For all hypothesis tests three different regressions are run - changing the usage of 
liquidity. It is done in order to maintain an acceptable number of observations 
making the results more trustworthy. One regression is with the current ratio, the 
second is without liquidity whereas the third is with the second proxy for liquidity 
and excluding tangibility.  The reason for the latter is because of the high level of 
VIF for tangibility, which exceeds the VIF threshold. In addition, it has a perfectly 
negative correlation with proportion of liquid assets (second proxy for liquidity). 
Hence, the coefficient values of the two variables and the constant are high and 
might cause incorrectly interpretation of the significance of liquidity.  
Equation (1) below is tested to investigate the first hypothesis. As explained in 
section 4.3.3 the initial VIF value for proportion of liquid assets was also 
exceeding the threshold as it included tangibility. However Table 2 presents the 
new value after excluding tangibility and this is below the threshold.  
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As mentioned the data set is unbalanced; this means that for some firms there are 
some missing years of data. Being able to test the hypothesis on this data, it is 
necessary to adjust for the unbalanced panel. This is done by importing the data as 
undated and unstructured panel in Eviews, as explained above.  
 
          𝛼0   𝛽            𝛽2      𝛽3𝐺   𝛽4 𝐷   𝛽5 𝐷2  
 𝛽6 𝐷3   𝛽7 𝐷4   𝛽8 𝐷5   𝛽9 𝐷6   𝛽 0 𝐷7   𝛽   𝐷8   𝛽 2            
 𝛽 3             𝛽 4          𝛽 5             𝜀                                                                  
                                                                                                                              (1) 
 
It is only in hypothesis 1 that the whole sample is used. For the remaining 
hypotheses the sample is divided in two. The split is between dispersed and 
concentrated ownership. The division is made on the criterion that ownership by 
the largest ultimate owner equal to or less than 50 percent, is the dispersed 
sample. For hypotheses 2-3 this sample is used.  Hypotheses 4-5 is based on the 
concentrated sample.  
 
The second hypothesis, 2A, is tested with a similar regression as in hypothesis 
one, however the ownership variable is not a dummy in this hypothesis, it’s the 
actual percentage held (2). As hypothesis two is tested on the dispersed sample, a 
single owner dummy is superfluous.  Hypothesis 2b is tested with a factor that 
gives the percentage ownership fraction that the CEO may have in the firm (3). 
This variable replaces the ultimate ownership variable, as these are correlated. 
Hypothesis 2c adds another variable; a dummy variable that is one if the CEO 
holds the largest ownership share and zero otherwise (4).  
 
          𝛼0   𝛽            𝛽2      𝛽3𝐺   𝛽4 𝐷   𝛽5 𝐷2  
 𝛽6 𝐷3   𝛽7 𝐷4   𝛽8 𝐷5   𝛽9 𝐷6   𝛽 0 𝐷7   𝛽   𝐷8   𝛽 2            
 𝛽 3             𝛽 4          𝜀     
                                                                                                                              (2) 
 
          𝛼0   𝛽                    𝛽2      𝛽3𝐺   𝛽4 𝐷  
 𝛽5 𝐷2   𝛽6 𝐷3   𝛽7 𝐷4   𝛽8 𝐷5   𝛽9 𝐷6   𝛽 0 𝐷7   𝛽   𝐷8  
 𝛽 2             𝛽 3             𝛽 4           𝜀                                                                                               
(3) 
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          𝛼0   𝛽           𝛽2      𝛽3𝐺   𝛽4 𝐷   𝛽5 𝐷2  
 𝛽6 𝐷3   𝛽7 𝐷4   𝛽8 𝐷5   𝛽9 𝐷6   𝛽 0 𝐷7   𝛽   𝐷8   𝛽 2            
 𝛽 3             𝛽 4           𝜀                                                             (4) 
 
          𝛼0   𝛽            𝛽2      𝛽3𝐺   𝛽4 𝐷   𝛽5 𝐷2  
 𝛽6 𝐷3   𝛽7 𝐷4   𝛽8 𝐷5   𝛽9 𝐷6   𝛽 0 𝐷7   𝛽   𝐷8   𝛽 2            
 𝛽 3             𝛽 4            𝛽 5          𝜀                            (5) 
 
In the fourth hypothesis, the relationship between leverage and growth 
opportunities is explored (5). Growth opportunities might be driven by industry 
specific determinants, but these effects are captured by the industry dummies.  
Usually Tobin’s Q would be used in this regression, but since this thesis examines 
private firms only, there are no market values available to calculate Tobin’s Q. In 
this regression the proxy for growth opportunities is revenue over total assets. The 
intuition for this is that a firm with high revenues to total assets will have a higher 
capacity to invest and also a need to expand.  
 
After examining the effects of ownership share, CEO ownership share and growth 
opportunities on the dispersed ownership sample, the remaining four hypotheses 
will examine the exact same relationships in the sample with concentrated 
ownership. The only exception is that in the concentrated sample a single owner 
dummy is included. For the concentrated sample it’s very important to capture any 
effects driven by the distributional imbalance caused by the single owners.  
 
In the concentrated sample, ownership share will go from just above 50 percent to 
100 percent. The split is made by creating a dummy in Eviews, and filtering the 
sample by defining the sample as a function of the dummy.  
The first step in running the regressions is to run pooled regressions where all 
observations are regressed together. Then run fixed effects regressions where 
dummies for every firm is included. Thus, it imposes time independent effects for 
each firm that possibly is correlated with the regressors. This approach will 
account for unobservable characteristics of the firms, which are assumed to be 
fixed over time. This assumption is relatively strong, and is a weakness to this 
method.  
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Random effects regression might work better when working with persistent 
variables, which is usually the case for both leverage and ownership 
concentration. Thus, the random effects regressions will be run as well. These two 
methods might show different results, and therefore a test of which one to use will 
be run. This test is called a Hausman-test. Under the null hypothesis, the Random 
effects model is preferred due to higher efficiency, while under the alternative 
hypothesis fixed effects is at least consistent and thus preferred. 
 
If random effects model is used when there is a fixed effect across firms, the 
random effects model will induce omitted variable bias. The error term will no 
longer be identically, independently distributed (i.i.d) nor random nor with a mean 
of zero. Thus, some assumptions for running OLS are violated.  
 
5.2 Fixed effects model estimation 
In addition to running regular pooled OLS regressions, the fixed effect estimation 
and random effect estimation was used. In order to test which of these models to 
use, the likelihood ratio test and the Hausman test was run. The first test was 
performed on the fixed effect result and resulted in not being able to just use the 
pooled results. The Hausman test resulted in having to implement the fixed effects 
model. Both the fixed effects results and the random effects regression results are 
included in the appendix (Table 5). 
 
Choosing the fixed effects model for panel data estimation in Eviews is equivalent 
to generating dummy variables for each of the firms and including them in a 
standard linear regression to control for these fixed "case effects". These effects 
are the unobservable firm characteristics for each individual firm. This method of 
estimation works best when there are fewer firms because each dummy variable 
remove one degree of freedom from the model. Choosing the fixed effects model 
in Eviews gives three options: cross-section fixed effect, period fixed effect or 
both.   
 
Statistically, fixed effects are always a reasonable thing to do with panel data 
(they always give consistent results) but they may not be the most efficient model 
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to run. Random effects will give better P-values as they are a more efficient 
estimator. 
 
After careful estimation and analysis, the regression models were run by using 
fixed effects across periods (years). All models include industry dummies, which 
gives a similar effect as having fixed effects for both period and cross-section 
without losing as many degrees of freedom.  
 
5.3 Endogeneity  
In the regression models, a problem with endogeneity would indicate correlation 
between leverage and the main variables and the error term. It can result from 
measurement error, autocorrelated errors, omitted variables and simultaneity. It 
would be a loop of causality between leverage and ownership, instead of the 
explanatory variable strictly explaining the variance of the dependent variable. 
(Kennedy 2008, 139). This is a severe error and of great concern for this thesis. 
However, this problem is not present as ownership is very stable across all 
samples and the VIF is lower than the threshold (Table 6).  
  
5.4 Expectations 
The first hypothesis predicts there to be higher leverage for firms without a 
majority shareholder than the ones with a majority. A greater ownership share 
increases the power of the largest shareholder and enhances monitoring 
incentives. The second hypothesis predicts that in firms with dispersed ownership, 
leverage is decreasing in the share of the largest shareholder. When the largest 
owner is also the CEO, she will have greater power to keep leverage low in order 
to benefit from higher levels of free cash flow. In addition to the low transparency 
of private firms, this may incentivise the CEO to use his power to entrench 
himself. The third hypothesis is therefore to test the prediction that in firms with 
dispersed ownership, leverage is decreasing in the ownership share of the CEO. 
When the CEO is the largest shareholder there would be an even lower level of 
leverage as the manager has full control over the capital structure decisions. This 
is tested in the fourth hypothesis. Leverage is expected to be lower when there are 
growth opportunities available for the firm. Owners recognize possibilities to 
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expand and thus allow lower leverage in order to exploit some valuable growth 
opportunities. The fifth hypothesis therefore predicts that in firms with dispersed 
ownership, leverage is decreasing in growth opportunities. 
In the sample with firms that has a majority shareholder, the hypotheses are the 
same. The same expectations about the signs are also equal.  
Apart from the industry dummies, the main variables and the control variables are 
expected to be significant as these are commonly used in empirical models 
explaining leverage.  
 
6. Empirical Results  
 
6.1. Hypothesis Test Results 
In this section results from the hypotheses tests are presented. The results are 
presented in Tables 7-15. Explanations with regards to agency theory or the 
alternative theories are provided for each table.  
 
The current ratio is commonly used as a liquidity measure. In this dataset 
however, the number of observations are much lower for this measurement 
compared to the other main variables. Therefore the proportion of liquid assets as 
a proxy for liquidity is used instead. The results are presented for three different 
regression models: with the current ratio, without liquidity, and proportion of 
liquid assets. In the regressions with proportion of liquid assets the R2 values vary 
between 21 and 36 percent. The R2 values for the current ratio is between 15,5 and 
27 percent. The R2 increases when including the CEO dummy. The firms 
reporting this variable might be larger and provide more reliable and consistent 
reporting. 
The number of cross-section observations and total panel observations for each 
regression is included at the bottom of each table. These clearly underpin the 
reason for changing the proxy from current ratio to proportion of liquid assets. 
The number of cross-section observations is about three times higher for 
proportion of liquid assets and about five times higher for the panel observations.  
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Table 7: Testing hypothesis 1 – The effect of Ownership Structure on Leverage 
Table 7 displays the coefficients obtained from equation 1 using an OLS panel regression model. 
The ownership variable is a dummy of 1 when the ownership structure is concentrated and 0 when 
ownership structure is dispersed. The first column shows the explanatory variables. The industry 
dummies are replaced with an indication that they have been included in the regression. The entire 
sample is used. T-values are presented in parentheses. *, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
Explanatory Variables Current Ratio Without liquidity Proportion of Liquid assets 
 
Concentration Dummy 
 
-0,017*** 
 
-0,023*** 
 
 -0,0062*** 
 (-5,899) (-18,73)  (-3,89) 
Size -0,012*** -0,012***  -0,011*** 
 (-11,159) (-29,95) (-28,79) 
 
GO -0,013*** -0,002  -0,0013** 
 (-9,122) (-1,457) (-2,23) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Tangibility 0,233*** 0,302***  
 (-36,614) (130,012)  
Performance -0,162*** -0,095***  -0,096*** 
 (-16,637) (-26,494) (-27,013) 
Liquidity -6.33E-06***   -0,30*** 
 (-12,059)  (-130) 
Single Owner Dummy    -0,029*** 
   (-16,89) 
C 0,467*** 0,278***  0,57*** 
  (21,476) (39,599) (83,6) 
R2 17 % 22,30 % 22,57 % 
Obs. Cross-sections included 9032 32206 32206 
Obs. Total panel (unbalanced)  17970 96458 96458 
 
The first hypothesis is not rejected. The firms with concentrated ownership have 
slightly less leverage compared to the firms with dispersed ownership. The 
ownership concentration dummy is significant at the 1 percent level. This supports 
the agency theory, but the coefficient is small and the difference between the two 
ownership structures is therefore not economically significant. 
Shareholders in a concentrated ownership structure have greater incentive for 
monitoring the managers and use less debt as a disciplinary device. Shareholders 
in a dispersed ownership structure have less power of the firm and hence require a 
higher level of debt in order to prevent entrenchment effect.  
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The small difference between the two ownership structures might be due to the 
way the sample is spilt. Even though everything above 50 percent gives the firm a 
majority shareholder, there might be someone that has an additional share that is 
not accounted for in the concentrated sample. A greater split between 
concentrated and dispersed ownership structure has been used for testing several 
regressions. None of them gave any significant impact on the results, therefore 
these are not provided in this paper. 
 
From Figure 1 it is clearly a large amount of single owner firms in the 
distribution of ownership concentration. This might drive the results, and is 
controlled for in the regression by including a single owner dummy. The dummy 
is negative and significant at the 1 percent level. Single owner firms have less debt 
compared to the rest of the sample, but the effect is not as large as expected from 
the impression made in figure 1. 
 
Another factor that might have affected the results is trade credit. Many small 
private firms have either trade credit instead of or in addition to institutional 
leverage. The relationship would perhaps be larger if trade credit was included in 
leverage. This paper will not investigate this further due to lack of data. 
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Dispersed Ownership Structure 
 
Table 8: Testing hypothesis 2A –The effect of Ownership Structure on Leverage for Firms 
with Dispersed Ownership  
Table 8 displays the coefficients obtained from equation 1 using an OLS panel regression model.  
The first column shows the explanatory variables. The industry dummies are replaced with an 
indication that they have been included in the regression. The dispersed sample is used. T-values 
are presented in parentheses. *, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Explanatory Variables Current Ratio Without liquidity Proportion of Liquid assets 
 
Ownership share 
 
0,076*** 
 
0,102*** 
  
0,10*** 
 (4,202) (12,923) (12,94) 
Size -0,008*** -0,007***  -0,006*** 
 (-4,752) (-10,477) (-10,38) 
GO  -0,018*** -0,007***  -0,007*** 
 (-8,400) (-6,562) (-6,63) 
Tangibility 0,244*** 0,318***   
 (26,245) (89,258)  
Performance -0,174*** -0,109***  -0,11*** 
 (-12,836) (-20,25) (-20,26) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Liquidity -6.50E-6***   -0,32*** 
 (-8,262)  (-89) 
C 0,371*** 0,18*** 0,50*** 
  (10,711) (14,782) (41,5) 
R2 19 % 23,78 % 24 % 
Obs. Cross-sections included 4634 16479 16479 
Obs. Total panel (unbalanced)  8520 43298 43298 
    
Hypothesis 2A focuses on the relationship between leverage and dispersed 
ownership structure. The results are statistically significant for all variables at the 
1 percent level (Table 8). Ownership share has a positive relationship with 
leverage. The hypothesis is therefore rejected. The results do not support the 
agency theory suggesting that debt is decreasing in the share of the largest 
shareholder. Nonetheless the results do support the pecking order theory. The 
control variable performance is negative (-0,11) and statistically significant at the 
1 percent level. It satisfies the pecking order theory which proposes that a decline 
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in internal funds causes the debt level to increase. Since firms regard issuance of 
equity to be expensive due to the asymmetric information problem, they will 
rather use internal funds before increasing debt. If they realise a decline in 
performance, they will have insufficient internal funds to finance new projects and 
would therefore increase debt. 
 
Table 9: Testing hypothesis 2B –Dispersed Ownership Structure with the CEO being a 
shareholder 
Table 9 displays the coefficients obtained from equation 2 using an OLS panel regression model. 
The first column shows the explanatory variables. The industry dummies are replaced with an 
indication that they have been included in the regression. The dispersed sample is used. T-values 
are presented in parentheses. *, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Explanatory Variables Current Ratio Without liquidity Proportion of Liquid Assets 
 
CEO Ownership share 
 
0,098*** 
 
0,071*** 
 
 0,071*** 
Size 0,003 0,004*** 0,004*** 
 (0,678) (2,683) (2,7) 
GO  -0,023***  -0.009***  -0.009*** 
 (-4,375) (-3,869)  (-3,87) 
Tangibility 0,308*** 0,431***  
 (15,004) (53,469)  
Performance -0,305*** -0,200***  -0,20*** 
 (-8,259) (-15,523) (-15,53) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Liquidity -1.13E-5***  -0,43 
 (-3,473)  (-53,46) 
C 0,272*** 0,048* 0,48 
  (3,086) (1,778) (17,53) 
R2 27 % 35,7 % 35,8 % 
Obs. Cross-sections included 987 3631 3631 
Obs. Total panel (unbalanced)  1660 8583 8583 
    
Hypothesis 2B is rejected.  The results from this hypothesis are presented in 
Table 9. CEO ownership share and leverage has a positive relationship of 0,071 
and is significant at the 1 percent level. The level of debt increases in the share of 
the CEO.  
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Because the hypothesis is rejected the capital structure cannot be explained by the 
agency theory. Nevertheless, the results support the pecking order theory. The 
performance variable is negative (-0,2) and significant at the 1 percent level and is 
economically significant. This means that as firm performance declines the level 
of debt increases. Information asymmetry problems make fundraising from 
issuing equity expensive. Firms therefore prefer to increase debt instead, or use 
internal funds for financing new projects. As internal funding is the cheapest 
alternative, they will increase debt only if the internal funds are not sufficient.  
 
 
Table 10: Testing hypothesis 2C – Dispersed Ownership Structure with a dummy for CEO 
being the Majority Shareholder 
Table 10 displays the coefficients obtained from equation 3 using an OLS panel regression model. 
The CEO variable is a dummy of 1 when CEO is the largest shareholder and 0 otherwise. The first 
column shows the explanatory variables. The industry dummies are replaced with an indication 
that they have been included in the regression. The dispersed sample is used. T-values are 
presented in parentheses. *, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Explanatory Variables Current Ratio Without liquidity Proportion of Liquid Assets 
 
CEO Dummy 
 
0,012 
 
0,020*** 
 
0,02*** 
 (1,23) (4,76) (-4,8) 
Size 0,0036 0,004** 0,004** 
 (0,83) (2,707) (-2,41) 
GO  -0,026*** -0,01***  -0,01*** 
 (-4,66) (-3,97) (-3,9) 
Tangibility 0,310*** 0,435***  
 (15,23) -15,19  
Performance -0,29*** -0,201***  -0,20*** 
 (-7,9) (-15,19) (-15,5) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Liquidity -1.2E-05***  -0,43*** 
 (-3,67)  (-53,7) 
C 0,28*** 0,053** 0,49 
  (3,23) (2,009) (18,8) 
R2 25,45 % 35,70 % 35,7 % 
Obs. Cross-sections included 987 3631 3631 
Obs. Total panel (unbalanced)  1660 8583 8583 
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The results in Table 10 imply that hypothesis 2C is rejected. There is no support 
of the agency theory. When the majority shareholder is also the CEO it actually 
has a positive impact on leverage, though, economically this relationship is small 
(0,02). The number of observations for the CEO series is limited and may induce 
insignificant results. However, these results give support to the pecking order 
theory. The coefficient for performance is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level. This indicates that firms with dispersed ownership structure 
regard internal funds and borrowing as more attractive than raising funds by 
issuing equity.  
 
Table 11: Testing hypothesis 3 – Exploring the effect of Growth Opportunities on Leverage 
in a Dispersed Ownership Structure 
Table 11 displays the coefficients obtained from equation 4 using a OLS panel regression model. 
The CEO variable is a dummy of 1 when CEO is the largest shareholder and 0 otherwise. The first 
column shows the explanatory variables. The industry dummies are replaced with an indication 
that they have been included in the regression. The dispersed sample is used. T-values are 
presented in parentheses. *, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Explanatory Variables Current Ratio Without liquidity Proportion of Liquid Assets 
 
CEO Dummy 
 
0,007 
 
0,018*** 
 
0,018*** 
 (-0,672) (-4,249) (4,24) 
Ownership share 0,101** 0,043** 0,043** 
 (-2,208) (-2,339) (2,33) 
Size 0,002 0,004*** 0,004*** 
 (-0,567) (-2,652) (2,65) 
GO  -0,024*** -0,01***  -0,0095*** 
 (-4,359) (-3,904) (-3,91) 
Tangibility 0,309*** 0,431***  
 (-15,052) (-53,62)  
Performance -0,302*** -0,201***  -0,2*** 
 (-8,153) (-15,555) (-15,55) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Liquidity -1.16E-5***  -0,43*** 
 (-3,572)  (-53,6) 
C 0,269*** 0,044 0,47 
  (-2,979) (-1,549)  (16,8) 
R2 27 % 35,80 % 35,8 % 
Obs. Cross-sections included 987 3631 3631 
Obs. Total panel (unbalanced)  1660 8583 8583 
GRA 19002  02.09.2013 
Page 36 
Hypothesis 3 focuses on the growth opportunity variable whereas the rest of the 
variables function as support variables. The results in Table 11 supports 
hypothesis 3, and so it cannot be rejected. There is a negative relationship 
between leverage and growth opportunities. Thus, leverage decreases as growth 
opportunities increase.  
 
A negative relationship between leverage and growth opportunities supports the 
agency theory behind the hypothesis. Particularly, it is expected that leverage will 
be determined as a function of growth opportunities in firms with dispersed 
ownership structure. Less leverage will be needed if there are possible investment 
opportunities that may increase shareholders’ wealth. The free cash flow, or 
internal funds of the firm, is spent on the new investments. The shareholders do 
not see the necessity of increasing debt since the growth opportunities are 
believed to be beneficial and not give rise to overinvestment issues.  
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Concentrated Ownership Structure 
 
Table 12: Testing hypothesis 4A- The effect of Ownership Structure on Leverage in a 
Concentrated Ownership Structure  
Table 12 displays the coefficients obtained from equation 1 using an OLS panel regression model. 
The single owner variable is a dummy of 1 when there is only one shareholder in the firm and 0 if 
there are more than one owner. The first column shows the explanatory variables. The industry 
dummies are replaced with an indication that they have been included in the regression. The 
concentrated sample is used. T-values are presented in parentheses. *, **, ***: significant at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. 
Explanatory Variables Current Ratio Without liquidity Proportion of Liquid Assets 
 
Ownership share 
 
-0,053*** 
 
-0,072*** 
  
-0,022** 
 (-4,728) (-15,721) (-2,51) 
Size -0,014*** -0,013***  -0,013*** 
 (-10,018) (-27,959) (-27,3) 
GO  -0,011*** 0,002** 0,002** 
 (-5,236) (-2,54) (2,28) 
Tangibility 0,225*** 0,286***  
 (-25,763) (-93,771)  
Performance -0,155*** -0,088***  -0,089*** 
 (-11,12) (-18,460) (-18,55) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Liquidity -6.04E-6***   -0,28*** 
 (-8,591)  (-93,9) 
Single Owner Dummy    -0,02*** 
   (-6,68) 
C 0,536*** 0,337*** 0,587*** 
  (-17,902) (-35,697) (55,7) 
R2 15,50 % 21,40 % 21,4 % 
Obs. Cross-sections included 5071 19556 19556 
Obs. Total panel (unbalanced)  9450 53160 53160 
 
The results from hypotheses 4A test are presented in Table 12. Hypothesis 4A 
cannot be rejected as there is a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between ownership share and leverage at the 1 percent level. This supports the 
agency theory stating that as ownership concentration increases shareholders’ 
incentives to monitor the managers. Therefore, leverage decreases as it becomes 
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decreasingly necessary to use debt as a means of control over managers. However, 
the economically significance is marginal (0,022).  
 
These results may be explained by the issue between the majority and the minority 
shareholders. Leverage decreases with the share of the majority shareholder. The 
increasing power of the majority shareholder may increase the incentive to 
expropriate funds from minority shareholders.  
 
The results also support the pecking order theory, as the variable performance is 
negative and significant at 1 percent level. The same explanation as for 2A applies 
here: Firms are willing to use internal funds when investing in new projects. If it 
becomes necessary to finance the project with external funds, the firm will choose 
debt before issuing equity as it is less costly. A decline in internal funds causes the 
debt level to increase. 
 
The single owner dummy has a negative relation with firm leverage. When there 
is only one owner of the firm, the level of debt is lower. Although the result is 
statistically significant at 1 percent level, it is not economically significant. The 
negative relationship can be explained by the fact that it is more expensive for 
single owner firms to borrow externally. Their firm is in general less liquid and 
due to the fact that they are privately held they are also less transparent. If a single 
owner firm realises economical difficulties it is less likely to repay debt claims. 
Debt holders are aware of this problem and will require compensation in the form 
of increased interest rates. The high borrowing cost limits the ability to increase 
leverage compared to multiple owners firms.  
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Table 13: Testing hypothesis 4B – Effect of Ownership Structure when the CEO has shares 
and the firms have Concentrated Ownership.  
Table 13 displays the coefficients obtained from equation 2 using a OLS panel regression model. 
The single owner variable is a dummy of 1 when there is only one shareholder in the firm and 0 if 
there are more than one owner. The first column shows the explanatory variables. The industry 
dummies are replaced with an indication that they have been included in the regression. The 
concentrated sample is used. T-values are presented in parentheses. *, **, ***: significant at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. 
Explanatory Variables Current Ratio Without liquidity Proportion of Liquid Assets 
 
CEO Ownership share 
 
0,025* 
 
-0,002 
 
0,002 
 (-1,724) (-0,291) (0,258) 
Size -0,001 0,007*** 0,007*** 
 (-0,052) (-5,481) (5,46) 
GO  -0,014*** -0,009*** -0,009*** 
 (-2,833) (-4,914) (-4,89) 
Tangibility 0,338*** 0,439***  
 (-18,578) (-61,619)  
Performance -0,185*** -0,217*** -0,217*** 
 (-4,452) (-16,05) (-16,05) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Liquidity -1.33E-5***  -0,44*** 
 (-4,528)  (-61,6) 
Single owner dummy   -0,0034 
   (-0,58) 
C 0,301*** -0,031 0,40*** 
  (-4,194) (-1,331) (16,7) 
R2 21,30 % 31,4 % 31,4 % 
Obs. Cross-sections included 1156 4505 4505 
Obs. Total panel (unbalanced)  2018 10650 10650 
 
In hypothesis 4B the relationship between the CEO as an owner and leverage is 
investigated. The results are presented in Table 13, showing no statistical 
significant relationship between the CEO as an owner and leverage. The weak 
result may be due to a small data size for CEO ownership share. This hypothesis 
test does not support the agency theory as it projects no effect from the CEO being 
an owner to the leverage. The hypothesis is therefore rejected.  
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There is support for the pecking order theory from the variable performance. The 
variable is negative (-0,217) and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
This means that when performance decreases, the level of leverage increases. This 
indicates that the firm regards equity issuance as too costly and hence turn to 
internal funds or debt for raising funds for new investments. Hence, when 
performance declines, and a decline in internal funds, the firm raises funds from 
increasing the debt level. The single owner dummy has no effect in this 
hypothesis test. This can be a result of the small number of observations using the 
CEO ownership sample. 
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Table 14: Testing hypothesis 4C – The effect of the CEO being the Majority Shareholder in 
Firms with Concentrated Ownership on Leverage.  
Table 14 displays the coefficients obtained from equation 3 using an OLS panel regression model. 
The CEO variable is a dummy of 1 when CEO is the largest shareholder and 0 otherwise. Single 
owner variable is a dummy of 1 when there is only one shareholder in the firm and 0 if there are 
more than one owner. The first column shows the explanatory variables. The industry dummies are 
replaced with an indication that they have been included in the regression. The concentrated 
sample is used. T-values are presented in parentheses. *, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1%.  
Explanatory Variables Current Ratio Without liquidity Proportion of Liquid Assets 
 
CEO Dummy 
 
0,017 
 
-0,002 
 
-0,001 
 (-1,558) (-0,430) (-0,150) 
Size 5.63E-5 0,007*** 0,007*** 
 (-0,015) (-5,345) (5,251) 
GO  -0,015*** -0,009*** -0,009*** 
 (-2,973) (-4,756) (-4,738) 
Tangibility 0,338*** 0,439***  
 (-18,592) (-61,684)  
Performance -0,185*** -0,215***  -0,215*** 
 (-4,457) (-15,979) (-15,976) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Liquidity -1.33E-5***  -0,44*** 
 (-4,522)  (-61,7) 
Single owner dummy   -0,002 
   (-0,53) 
C 0,302*** -0,022 0,417*** 
  -4,344 (-1,022) (18) 
R2 21,30 % 31,40 % 31,40 % 
Obs. Cross-sections included 1156 4505 4505 
Obs. Total panel (unbalanced)  2018 10650 10650 
 
Hypothesis 4C is rejected. In the sample with dispersed ownership, the CEO 
dummy was significant, however, from Table 14 it is evident that there is no 
effect in this sample. It indicates that having the CEO as a majority shareholder in 
a firm does not significantly affect leverage. The performance coefficient is 
negative (-0,215) and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This supports 
the pecking order theory. The level of leverage increases when firm performance 
decreases. When a firm has good performance it has internal funds to finance its 
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operations and investments. If external funding is necessary, it will choose debt 
over equity issuance as the former is less costly. Therefore the debt level increases 
if firm performance is negative. 
 
Table 15: Testing hypothesis 5- Exploring the effect of Growth Opportunities on Leverage in 
a Concentrated Ownership Structure 
Table 15 displays the coefficients obtained from equation 1 using OLS panel regression model. 
The single owner variable is a dummy of 1 when there is only one shareholder in the firm and 0 if 
there are more than one owner. The first column shows the explanatory variables. The industry 
dummies are replaced with an indication that they have been included in the regression. The 
concentrated sample is used. T-values are presented in parentheses. *, **, ***: significant at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. 
Explanatory Variables Current Ratio Without liquidity Proportion of Liquid Assets 
 
Ownership Share 
 
-0,038* 
 
-0,072*** 
 
 -0,021** 
 (-1,93) (-15,721) (-2,26) 
Size -0,005** -0,013***  -0,008*** 
 (-2,35) (-27,96) (-10,10) 
GO -0,022*** 0,002** -0,002 
 (-7,82) (-2,54) (-1,43) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Tangibility 0,22*** 0,286***  
 (17,28) (-93,771)  
Performance -0,173*** -0,088***  -0,121*** 
 (-8,755) (-18,46) (-15,67) 
Liquidity -4.44E-6***   -0,3** 
 (-5,14)  (-59,8) 
Single ownership dummy    -0,035*** 
   (-3,44) 
C 0,435*** 0,337*** 0,53*** 
  (9,3) (-35,697) (32) 
R2 15,50 % 21,35 % 20,90 % 
Obs. Cross-sections included 2597 9265 9265 
Obs. Total panel (unbalanced)  4617 21765 21765 
    
 
The results in Table 15 reject hypothesis 5. The growth opportunity variable is 
negatively related to leverage, however it is neither statistically nor economically 
significant. The results do not support the agency theory. 
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On the contrary, the pecking order theory holds as the performance variable is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient is also 
economically significant. This means that the firm will increase the leverage when 
the internal funds have been reduced due to poor performance. New projects are 
finance with debt if external fundraising is necessary.  
 
 
6.2.1 Control Variables 
The variables that are not central to the hypotheses are not given much emphasis 
to, however there are some that are interesting to examine further. The variables 
that are not consistent across OLS panel regressions, significant statistically or 
economically significant has been excluded from this discussion. Nevertheless, 
there are two variables with consistently large and significant regression 
coefficients, namely tangibility and performance.  
 
Tangibility 
This variable measures the size of collateral. It is an important element in the 
context of obtaining institutional debt. Firms with low collateral may have to 
finance with trade credit as they do not pass the requirements for obtaining 
institutional loans. They will therefore have zero leverage in this paper's sample as 
it does not have data on trade credit. In the regressions, tangibility has positive 
coefficient and lie around 25-40 percent, and is significant at the 1 percent level.  
 
Performance 
This variable would indicate how successful the firm is. If a firm has high 
performance there is less need for leverage to finance operations and investments. 
Performance is consistently negative and significant in all OLS panel regressions. 
It lies around 15-25 percent and is therefore economically significant. It is also 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level throughout the regressions. This is 
persistent with pecking order theory proposing that if firms follow a pecking order  
it prefers internal to external financing and debt to equity if it is to use external 
financing. 
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7. Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis is to find out whether or not there is agency costs 
present in Norwegian private firms. Additionally, it seeks to find out whether 
owners use debt as a disciplinary device on management in order to reduce over-
and underinvestment problems.  
 
All the hypotheses are built on the premise that there are agency costs within 
Norwegian private firms. This paper finds that firms with dispersed ownership 
have higher leverage than firms with concentrated ownership. Shareholders in a 
concentrated ownership structure have greater incentive for monitoring the 
managers and use less debt as a disciplinary device contrary to shareholders in a 
dispersed ownership structure.  
 
Furthermore, the leverage is decreasing with growth opportunities when firms 
have dispersed ownership structure. Less leverage will be needed as a disciplinary 
device, if growth opportunities are believed to increase shareholders’ wealth. 
Also, leverage is decreasing with ownership share in the concentrated ownership 
sample. Ownership concentration increases shareholders’ incentives to monitor 
the managers, hence using debt as a governance mechanism decline. These results 
confirm the agency theory. This paper does not find support for the agency theory 
when the CEO has ownership shares in the firm. It can be explained by the limited 
number of observations in the CEO-series.  
 
Instead of there being an indication that debt is determined only on the basis of the 
agency theory, there seems that pecking order theory is a stronger and more 
persistent explanation of capital structure.   
 
The results in this paper imply that Norwegian private firms have some problems 
related to agency costs, and that their capital structure is also explained by the 
pecking order theory.  
 
 
 
 
GRA 19002  02.09.2013 
Page 45 
8. References 
Baker, Malcolm, and Jeffrey Wurgler. 2002.“Market timing and capital structure”. 
Journal of Finance. 57:1–32 
 
 
Berle, Adolf A., and Gardiner C. Means. 1932. The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. 
 
Berzins, Janis and Øyvind Bøhren. 2007.  “Corporate governance and business 
economics outside the Oslo Stock Exchange.” The state’s ownership report 
2007 :40-43 
 
Brito, José A., Kose John, 2002, “Leverage and growth opportunities: risk 
avoidance induced by risky debt”. Working Paper. University of New York, 
Salomon Centre (Stern School of Business). 
 
Burkart, Mike, Dennis Gromb, and Fausto Panunzi. 1997. “Large shareholders, 
monitoring, and the value of the firm”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 693–
728. 
Bøhren, Øyvind. Fall 2012. Lecture notes: Private Firm. BI Norwegian Business 
School. 
 
DeAngelo, Harry, Linda DeAngelo, and Karen H. Wruck. 2002. “Asset liquidity, 
debt covenants, and managerial discretion in financial distress: The collapse of 
L.A. Gear”. Journal of Financial Economics 64: 3–34. 
 
Demsetz, Harold and Kenneth Lehn. 1985. "The Structure of Corporate 
Ownership: Causes and Consequences." Journal of Political Economy 93: 1155-
1177. 
 
Fama, Eugene, and Ken French. 2002. “Testing Tradeoff and Pecking Order 
Predictions about Dividends and Debt”. Review of Financial Studies 15: 1-33. 
 
GRA 19002  02.09.2013 
Page 46 
Fama, Eugene, and Michael Jensen. 1983. “Separation of ownership and control”. 
Journal of Law and Economics 26: 301-325. 
 
Frank, Murray Z., and Vidhan K. Goyal. 2009. “Profits and Capital Structure”. 
Working Paper. University of Minnesota. 
Goergen, Marc. 2012. International Corporate Governance.  Essex. Pearson. 
 
Graham John R., and Campbell R. Harvey. 2001.”The theory and practice of 
corporate finance: evidence from the field”. Journal of Financial Economics 60: 
187-243. 
 
Grinblatt, Mark, and Sheridan Titman. 2002.  Financial Markets and Corporate 
Strategy. New York: McGraw-Hill Education.  
 
Harris, Milton, and Arthur Raviv. 1991. “The Theory of Capital Structure”.  
The Journal of Finance. 46: 297-355.  
 
Jensen Michael C.. 1986. “Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and 
take- overs”.  American Economic Review 76: 323-329. 
 
Jensen Michael C.. 1989. “Eclipse of the Public Corporation”. Harvard Business 
Review 67: 81-74. 
 
Jensen Michael C., and William H. Meckling. 1976. “Theory of the firm: 
managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure”. Journal of 
Financial Economics 3: 305-360. 
 
Johnson, Simon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei 
Schleifer. 2000. “Tunnelling”. American Economic Review  90(2): 22-27. 
 
Kennedy, Peter. 2008. A Guide to Econometrics. 6th Edition. Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell.  
 
GRA 19002  02.09.2013 
Page 47 
Kim, Chang-Soo, David C. Maurer, and Mark H. Stohs. 1995. “Corporate Debt 
Maturity Policy and Investor Tax-Timing Option: Theory and Evidence”. 
Financial Management 24: 33-45. 
 
Kraus, Alan, and Robert H. Litzenberger. 1973. “A State-Preference Model of 
Optimal Financial Leverage”. Journal of Finance September: 911-922. 
 
Miller, Merton. 1977. “Debt and taxes”. Journal of Finance 32: 261-275. 
 
Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H. Miller. 1958. “The cost of capital, corporation 
finance and the theory investment”. The American Economic Review 58 (3): 261-
297.  
 
Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H. Miller. 1963. “Corporate income taxes and the 
cost of capital: a correction”. The American Economic Review 53: 433-443.  
 
Morellec, Erwan. 2001. “Asset liquidity, capital structure, and secured debt”. 
Journal of Financial Economics 61 (August): 173–206. 
 
Morgado, Arthur, and Julio Pindado. 2003. “Underinvestment and overinvestment 
hypotheses: an analysis using panel data”. European Financial Management 9(2): 
163-177. 
 
Myers, Stewart C.. 1977. “Determinants of corporate borrowing”. Journal of 
Financial Economics 5: 146-175. 
 
Myers, Stewart C., and Nicholas S. Majluf. 1984. “Corporate Financing and 
Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do not 
Have”.  Journal of Financial Economics 13: 187-221. 
 
O’Brien, Robert M.  2007. “A caution regarding rules of thumb for variance 
inflation factors”.  Quality and Quantity 41: 673–690. 
 
Ozkan, Aydin. 2002. “The Determinants of Corporate Debt Maturity: Evidence 
From UK Firms”. Applied Financial Economics 12: 19–24.  
GRA 19002  02.09.2013 
Page 48 
 
Rajan, Raghuram G., and Luigi Zingales. 1995. “What do we know about capital 
structure? Some evidence from international data”. The Journal of Finance 50 (5): 
1421-60. 
 
Scherr, Frederick C., and Heather M. Hulburt. 2001. “The debt maturity structure 
of small firms”. Financial Management Spring: 8-111. 
 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 1986. “Large Shareholders and 
Corporate Control”. Journal of Political Economy 94: 461-488. 
Sibilkov, Valeriy. 2007. “Asset Liquidity and Capital Structure”. Working Paper. 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. 
 
Smith, Adam. 1776. The Wealth of Nations. Edited by Edwin Cannan. 1904. 
Reprint. New York: Modern Library, 1937. 
 
Stulz, René M.. 1990. “Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies”. 
Journal of Financial Economics 26: 3–28. 
 
Tirole, Jean. 2006. The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Titman, Sheridan, and Roberto Wessels. 1988. “The determinants of capital 
structure choice”. Journal of Finance 43: 1-19. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GRA 19002  02.09.2013 
Page 49 
9. Appendix 
 
1.Descriptive statistics per year 
 
2006 CEO ownership GO Leverage Liquidity Ownership Performance Revenue Size Tangibility 
 Mean 0,56 0,96 0,15 0,74 0,64 0,08 51297649 16,89 0,22 
 Median 0,50 0,13 0,00 0,93 0,60 0,05 3813500 17,28 0,08 
 Maximum 1,00 6,96 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,97 1,06E+09 20,79 1,00 
 Minimum 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -1,23 0 9,74 0,00 
 St. Dev. 0,35 1,33 0,25 0,33 0,31 0,16 1,43E+08 2,06 0,28 
 Skewness 0,08 1,62 1,66 -1,06 -0,13 0,58 5,30069 -1,07 1,38 
 Kurtosis 1,53 5,82 4,63 2,58 1,63 12,61 34,27371 4,54 3,72 
 Observations 3465 24018 24018 24018 24018 24018 24018 14490 14490 
         
 
 
2007 CEO ownership GO Leverage Liquidity Ownership Performance Revenue Size Tangibility 
 Mean 0,60 0,94 0,15 0,73 0,64 0,08 50145092 16,82 0,22 
 Median 0,50 0,09 0,00 0,93 0,58 0,04 2509500 17,26 0,08 
 Maximum 1,00 6,96 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,97 1,06E+09 20,79 1,00 
 Minimum 0,04 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -1,23 0 9,74 0,00 
 St. Dev. 0,34 1,33 0,25 0,34 0,31 0,16 1,42E+08 2,13 0,28 
 Skewness -0,01 1,63 1,70 -1,05 -0,05 0,45 5,326493 -1,03 1,38 
 Kurtosis 1,49 5,72 4,75 2,52 1,50 11,92 34,62759 4,26 3,67 
 Observations 5526 27370 27370 27370 27370 27370 27370 16247 16247 
          2008 CEO ownership GO Leverage Liquidity Ownership Performance Revenue Size Tangibility 
 Mean 0,60 0,92 0,15 0,72 0,64 0,06 50565229 16,81 0,23 
 Median 0,51 0,08 0,00 0,92 0,55 0,03 2141000 17,25 0,09 
 Maximum 1,00 6,96 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,97 1,06E+09 20,79 1,00 
 Minimum 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -1,23 0 9,74 0,00 
 St. Dev. 0,34 1,33 0,25 0,34 0,31 0,17 1,45E+08 2,14 0,29 
 Skewness -0,03 1,70 1,70 -0,95 -0,02 -0,50 5,287003 -0,98 1,28 
 Kurtosis 1,47 6,01 4,70 2,32 1,50 14,39 33,85862 4,16 3,36 
 Observations 5733 28435 28435 28435 28435 28435 28435 16714 16714 
          2009 CEO ownership GO Leverage Liquidity Ownership Performance Revenue Size Tangibility 
 Mean 0,61 0,87 0,14 0,71 0,64 0,06 48492872 16,71 0,24 
 Median 0,51 0,07 0,00 0,92 0,55 0,03 1865000 17,15 0,09 
 Maximum 1,00 6,96 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,97 1,06E+09 20,79 1,00 
 Minimum 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -1,23 0 9,74 0,00 
 Std, Dev, 0,34 1,29 0,25 0,35 0,31 0,15 1,42E+08 2,18 0,30 
 Skewness -0,06 1,79 1,71 -0,90 -0,02 -0,29 5,387717 -0,96 1,23 
 Kurtosis 1,47 6,46 4,74 2,19 1,49 15,37 35,10819 4,07 3,18 
 Observations 5796 28607 28607 28607 28607 28607 28607 16795 16795 
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          2010 CEO ownership GO Leverage Liquidity Ownership Performance Revenue Size Tangibility 
 Mean 0,62 0,86 0,11 0,73 0,64 0,06 45466495 16,63 0,23 
 Median 0,52 0,06 0,00 0,93 0,57 0,03 1509000 17,10 0,08 
 Maximum 1,00 6,96 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,97 1,06E+09 20,79 1,00 
 Minimum 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 -1,23 0 9,74 0,00 
 Std, Dev, 0,34 1,30 0,23 0,35 0,31 0,15 1,38E+08 2,19 0,30 
 Skewness -0,11 1,86 2,17 -0,98 -0,07 -0,19 5,612571 -0,94 1,32 
 Kurtosis 1,47 6,78 6,66 2,33 1,49 15,50 37,82165 3,98 3,40 
 Observations 5454 26815 26815 26815 26815 26815 26815 15602 15602 
          
          2011 CEO ownership GO Leverage Liquidity Ownership Performance Revenue Size Tangibility 
 Mean 0,62 0,88 0,11 0,73 0,64 0,06 46128221 16,65 0,22 
 Median 0,55 0,07 0,00 0,94 0,58 0,03 1820000 17,11 0,07 
 Maximum 1,00 6,96 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,97 1,06E+09 20,79 1,00 
 Minimum 0,05 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -1,23 0 9,74 0,00 
 Std, Dev, 0,34 1,32 0,22 0,35 0,31 0,15 1,38E+08 2,17 0,30 
 Skewness -0,13 1,82 2,21 -1,01 -0,06 -0,03 5,558018 -0,92 1,36 
 Kurtosis 1,48 6,64 6,84 2,39 1,49 14,91 37,23635 3,98 3,52 
 Observations 5856 28173 28173 28173 28173 28173 28173 16610 16610 
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2. ANOVA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Three assumptions for using ANOVA 
This table presents the results for the homogeneity Levene’s test, Normally Distributed errors, 
Jarque-Bera p-value and independent error terms. These form the basis for running an ANOVA test. 
The Levene’s test is used for equality of variance when testing for homogeneity of variance between 
the two groups. The null hypothesis is that the variances of the samples are equal. From the table it 
is evidence that it is only for Growth Opportunity that cannot reject the null hypothesis and conclude 
that this variable has homogeneity of variance. The remaining variables have a p-value below 
5percent, thus the null hypothesis is reject, and there is heterogeneity. First assumption is violated 
for all variables except growth opportunity. For the second assumption the Jarque-Bera test is used 
as well as the distribution of the graph of each variable. The second assumption was violated for all 
variables. Problems concerning independent error terms are rarely a case in cross-sectional data, 
however, the paper did check for the third assumption by looking into the scatter plot of the actual 
observations for each variable as Eviews does not report the errors. 
  Homogeneity Normally Distributed errors Independent error terms  
Variables Levene's Test (Jarque-Bera p-value)    
Leverage 0,000 Non-normal  (0,000) Independent  
Revneue 0,000 Non-normal  (0,000) Independent  
Growth 
Opportunity 0,321 Non-normal  (0,000) Independent 
 
Tangibility 0,000 Non-normal  (0,000) Independent  
Performance 0,000 Non-normal  (0,000) Independent  
Ownership 0,000 Non-normal  (0,000) Independent  
Liquidity 0,000 Non-normal  (0,000) Independent  
CEO 
Ownership 0,000 Non-normal  (0,000) Independent 
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3. Industry Sector Codes 
NAICS Code NAICS Label Industry Sector Code Industry Sector Label 
1 Agriculture and hunting 1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining 
2 Forestry and logging 1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining 
5 Fishing, fish farming, incl. Services 1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining 
10 Coal mining and peat extraction 1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining 
12 Mining of uranium and thorium ores 1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining 
13 Mining of metal ores 1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining 
14 Other mining and quarrying 1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining 
27 Basic metals 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
28 Fabricated metal products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
30 Office machinery and computers 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
32 Radio, TV sets, communication equip 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers, semi-tr. 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
33 Instruments, watches and clocks 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
25 Rubber and plastic products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
24 Chemicals and chemical products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
35 Other transport equipment 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
22 Publishing, printing, reproduction 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
20 Wood and wood products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
19 Footwear and leather products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
18 Wearing apparel., fur 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
17 Textile products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
16 Tobacco products p 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
15 Food products and beverages 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
23 Refined petroleum products 2 Manufacturing, chemical products 
40 Electricity, gas and steam supply 3 Energy 
11 Oil and gas extraction, incl. Serv. 3 Energy 
45 Construction 4 Construction 
91 Membership organizations n.e.c. 5 Service 
74 Other business activities 5 Service 
73 Research and development 5 Service 
72 Computers and related activities 5 Service 
71 Renting of machinery and equipment 5 Service 
37 Recycling 5 Service 
80 Education 5 Service 
99 Extra-territorial org. And bodies 5 Service 
85 Health and social work 5 Service 
75 Public administration and defense 5 Service 
90 Sewage, refuse disposal activities 5 Service 
70 Real estate activities 5 Service 
92 Cultural and sporting activities 5 Service 
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55 Hotels and restaurants 5 Service 
93 Other service activities 5 Service 
95 Domestic services 5 Service 
50 Motor vehicle services 5 Service 
41 Water supply 5 Service 
64 Post and telecommunications 5 Service 
66 Insurance and pension funding 6 Financial 
65 Financial intermediation, less ins. 6 Financial 
67 Auxiliary financial intermediation 6 Financial 
52 Retail trade, repair personal goods 7 Trade 
51 Wholesale trade, commission trade 7 Trade 
63 Supporting transport activities 8 Transport 
62 Air transport 8 Transport 
61 Water transport 8 Transport 
60 Land transport, pipeline transport 8 Transport 
  
9 Multisector 
    0 Missing 
 
4. Variables obtained from the CCGR database 
 
  
Item  Description 
4 CEO birth year 
6 Enterprise type 
9 Revenue 
15+16 Depreciation of fixed assets and intangible assets and write-down of fixed assets and intangible assets 
19 Operating Income 
30 Other interest expense 
31 Other financial expenses 
51 Total fixed assets (tangible) 
63+78 Total fixed assets and Total current assets 
65+102 Accounts receivable and Accounts payable 
94 Liabilities to financial institutions 
101 Liabilities to financial institutions – short-term 
113 Number of employees 
13601 Share owned by CEO 
14011 %Equity held by ultimate owner with rank 1 
14023 Aggregate fraction held by international owner 
14025 Herfindahl Index 
14507 Is independent 
15302 Largest family sum ultimate ownership 
15304 Largest family has CEO 
11102 Industry codes 
17002 Listing status on Oslo Børs (Filter dummy variable) 
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5. Panel Regression Results for Fixed and Random Effects 
Hypothesis 1 
    
Explanatory 
Variables 
Fixed 
 
Random 
 
 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Concentration Dummy -0,006232 0,0001 -0,001997 0,1644 
Size -0,011158 0 -0,000871 0,0382 
GO -0,001374 0,0252 -0,013454 0 
Industry Dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Tangibility 
 
0 
 
0 
Performance -0,0963 0 -0,070666 0 
Liquidity -0,301528 0 -0,271779 0 
Single Owner Dummy -0,028661 0 -0,017652 0 
C 0,574071 
 
0,404387 
 
Obs. Cross-sections included 32206 
 
32206 
 
Obs. Total panel (unbalanced) 96458 
 
96458 
 
   
Weighted statistics Unweighted statistics 
R2 0,2257 
 
0,116 0,195425 
S.E. of regression 0,190795 
 
0,09054 
 
Sum squared resid 3510,622 
 
790,5863 3647,84 
Log likelihood 22929,88 
   
F-statistic 1479,425 
 
909,6108 
 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
 
0 
 
Mean dependent var 0,123377 
 
0,036759 0,123377 
S.D. dependent var 0,216804 
 
0,098905 
 
Akaike info criterion -0,475023 
   
Schwarz criterion -0,473058 
   
Hannan-Quinn criter. -0,474426 
   
Durbin-Watson stat 0,313623 
 
1,147255 0,290686 
 
Hypothesis 2A 
   Explanatory Variables Fixed   Random   
  Coefficient   p-value   Coefficient   p-value  
Ownership share 0,102227 0 0,070636 0 
Size -0,006763 0 0,002131 0,0013 
GO -0,00671 0 -0,018149 0 
Performance -0,108589 0 -0,082052 0 
Industry Dummies 
    
Liquidity -0,317799 0 -0,295181 0 
C 0,499085 0 0,361952 0 
Obs. Cross-sections included 16479 
 
16479 
 Obs. Total panel (unbalanced)  43298 
 
43298 
 
   
Weighted statistics Unweighted statistics 
R2 0,237794 
 
0,137677 0,215666 
S.E. of regression 0,19746 
 
0,09054 0,091818 
Sum squared resid 1687,463 
 
790,5863 364,9078 
Log likelihood 8811,208 
  
 F-statistic 750,1225 
 
909,6108 531,5874 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
 
0 0 
    Mean dependent var 0,137898 
 
0,036759 0,123377 
    S.D. dependent var 0,226127 
 
0,098905 0,101662 
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    Akaike info criterion -0,406125 
  
     Schwarz criterion -0,402318 
  
     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0,404925 
  
     Durbin-Watson stat 0,324151   1,147255 1,187574 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 2B 
   Explanatory Variables Fixed   Random   
  Coefficient   p-value   Coefficient   p-value  
CEO Ownership 0,070725 0 0,090978 0 
Size 0,004243 0,0073 0,009754 0 
GO -0,009373 0,0001 -0,024789 0 
Performance -0,200409 0 -0,128938 0 
Industry Dummies Yes 
Liquidity -0,430483 0 -42,40762 0 
C 0,478866 0 13,12344 0 
Obs. Cross-sections included 3631 
 
3631 
 Obs. Total panel (unbalanced)  8583 
 
8583 
 
   
Weighted Statistics Unweighted Statistics 
R2 0,357767 
 
0,235244 0,334555 
S.E. of regression 0,180879 
 
0,082551 
 
Sum squared resid 280,1913 
 
58,39552 290,318 
Log likelihood 2507,048 
 
  F-statistic 265,04 
 
202,7606 
 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
 
0 
 
    Mean dependent var 0,149975 
 
0,046449 0,149975 
    S.D. dependent var 0,225469 
 
0,097291 
 
    Akaike info criterion -0,579762 
 
      Schwarz criterion -0,564139 
 
      Hannan-Quinn criter. -0,574433 
  
     Durbin-Watson stat 0,325497   1,19862 0,301889 
 
Hypothesis 2C 
   Explanatory Variables Fixed   Random   
 
        
CEO Dummy 0,019929 0 0.019498 0.0000 
Size 0,003794 0,0159 0.009324 0.0000 
GO -0,009553 0,0001 -0.024873 0.0000 
Performance -0,200255 0 -0.128087 0.0000 
Industry Dummies 
 
Liquidity -0,431848 0 -0.393635 0.0000 
C 0,497138 0 0.396381 0.0000 
Obs. Cross-sections included 3631 
 
3631 
 Obs. Total panel (unbalanced)  8583 
 
8583 
 
   
Weighted Statistics Unweighted Statistics 
R2 0,35749 
 
0.234596 0.334313 
S.E. of regression 0,180918 
 
0.082575 
 
Sum squared resid 280,3122 
 
58.42852 290.4236 
Log likelihood 2505,196 
 
  F-statistic 264,7205 
 
202.0307 
 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
 
0.000000 
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    Mean dependent var 0,149975 
 
0.046437 0.149975 
    S.D. dependent var 0,225469 
 
0.097276 
 
    Akaike info criterion -0,57933 
 
      Schwarz criterion -0,563707 
 
      Hannan-Quinn criter. -0,574002 
  
     Durbin-Watson stat 0,325372   1.198055 0.302047 
 
Hypothesis 3 
   Explanatory Variables Fixed   Random   
  Coefficient   p-value   Coefficient   p-value  
CEO Dummy 0,017827 0 0,018922 0 
Ownership 0,043387 0,0193 0,046976 0,0254 
Size 0,004193 0,008 0,00954 0 
GO -0,009456 0,0001 -0,024788 0 
Performance -0,200838 0 -0,128519 0 
Industry Dummies 
 
Liquidity -0,430968 0 -0,392594 0 
C 0,474492 0 0,374057 0 
Obs. Cross-sections included 3631 
 
3631 
 Obs. Total panel (unbalanced)  8583 
 
8583 
 
   
Weighted Statistics Unweighted Statistics 
R2 0,3579 
 
0,235032 0,334916 
S.E. of regression 0,180871 
 
0,082564 
 
Sum squared resid 280,1331 
 
58,40646 290,1607 
Log likelihood 2507,939 
 
  F-statistic 251,207 
 
188,0338 
 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
 
0 
 
    Mean dependent var 0,149975 
 
0,046445 0,149975 
    S.D. dependent var 0,225469 
 
0,097286 
 
    Akaike info criterion -0,579736 
 
      Schwarz criterion -0,563291 
 
      Hannan-Quinn criter. -0,574127 
  
     Durbin-Watson stat 0,325427   1,198952 0,302107 
 
Hypothesis 4A 
   Explanatory Variables Fixed   Random   
  Coefficient   p-value   Coefficient   p-value  
Ownership -0,021922 0,0122 -0,015505 0,0602 
Size -0,013109 0 -0,004259 0 
GO 0,001748 0,0222 -0,009562 0 
Performance -0,088584 0 -0,06042 0 
Industry Dummies 
 
Liquidity -0,286091 0 -0,247954 0 
Single Owner Dummy -0,021096 0 -0,011879 0,0001 
C 0,587578 0 0,436033 0 
Obs. Cross-sections included 19556 
 
19556 
 Obs. Total panel (unbalanced)  53160 
 
53160 
 
   
Weighted Statistics Unweighted Statistics 
R2 0,214348 
 
0,107625 0,183938 
S.E. of regression 0,184539 
 
0,083871 
 
Sum squared resid 1809,66 
 
373,8405 1879,707 
Log likelihood 14414,07 
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F-statistic 763,058 
 
457,8272 
 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
 
0 
 
    Mean dependent var 0,11155 
 
0,032827 0,11155 
    S.D. dependent var 0,208159 
 
0,090975 
 
    Akaike info criterion -0,541538 
 
 
     Schwarz criterion -0,538196 
 
 
     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0,540494 
 
 
     Durbin-Watson stat 0,300251  1,136504 0,277283 
 
Hypothesis 4B 
   Explanatory Variables Fixed   Random   
  Coefficient   p-value   Coefficient   p-value  
CEO Ownership 0,002441 0,7963 0,014426 0,1911 
Size 0,007323 0 0,007313 0 
GO -0,009006 0 -0,01871 0 
Performance -0,216517 0 -0,118538 0 
Industry Dummies 
 
Liquidity -0,438417 0 
 
0 
Single Owner Dummy -0,003408 0,5602 
 
0,0478 
C 0,406522 0 
 
0 
Obs. Cross-sections included 4505 
 
4505 
 Obs. Total panel (unbalanced)  10650 
 
10650 
 
   
Weighted Statistics Unweighted Statistics 
R2 0,314197 
 
0,192582 0,282227 
S.E. of regression 0,186766 
 
0,080121 
 
Sum squared resid 370,7899 
 
68,27068 388,0747 
Log likelihood 2767,949 
   F-statistic 256,32 
 
181,1864 
 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
 
0 
 
    Mean dependent var 0,146859 
 
0,042694 0,146859 
    S.D. dependent var 0,225325 
 
0,091804 
 
    Akaike info criterion -0,516047 
       Schwarz criterion -0,502388 
       Hannan-Quinn criter. -0,511438 
 
 
     Durbin-Watson stat 0,310983  1,247703 0,278822 
 
Hypothesis 4C 
   Explanatory Variables Fixed   Random   
  Coefficient   p-value   Coefficient   p-value  
CEO dummy -0,000796 0,8805 0,006128 0,318 
Size 0,006692 0 0,006246 0 
GO -0,008619 0 -0,017972 0 
Performance -0,215202 0 -0,117269 0 
Industry Dummies 
 
Liquidity -0,438721 0 -0,358329 0 
Single Owner Dummy -0,002244 0,5922 -0,009055 0,0657 
C 0,41798 0 0,399177 0 
Obs. Cross-sections included 4505 
 
4505 
 Obs. Total panel (unbalanced)  10650 
 
10650 
 
   
Weighted Statistics Unweighted Statistics 
R2 0,314064 
 
0,192194 0,282175 
S.E. of regression 0,186784 
 
0,080153 
 
Sum squared resid 370,8616 
 
68,32481 388,1033 
Log likelihood 2766,919 
   F-statistic 256,1622 
 
180,7351 
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Prob(F-statistic) 0 
 
0 
 
    Mean dependent var 0,146859 
 
0,042706 0,146859 
    S.D. dependent var 0,225325 
 
0,091819 
 
    Akaike info criterion -0,515853 
       Schwarz criterion -0,502195 
       Hannan-Quinn criter. -0,511244 
       Durbin-Watson stat 0,311189  1,248312 0,279191 
 
Hypothesis 5 
   Explanatory Variables Fixed   Random   
  Coefficient   p-value   Coefficient   p-value  
Ownership -0,020457 0,0235 -0,021176 0,0296 
Size -0,00866 0 -0,000832 0,3594 
GO -0,001858 0,1525 -0,01647 0 
Performance -0,120912 0 -0,073064 0 
Industry Dummies 
 
Liquidity -0,298172 0 -0,268899 0 
Single Owner Dummy -0,034928 0,0006 -0,018318 0,046 
C 0,53293 0 0,413875 0 
Obs. Cross-sections included 9265 
 
9265 
 Obs. Total panel (unbalanced)  21765 
 
21765 
 
   
Weighted Statistics Unweighted Statistics 
R2 0,208728 
 
0,123349 0,181144 
S.E. of regression 0,190047 
 
0,085279 
 
Sum squared resid 785,3799 
 
158,1762 812,7579 
Log likelihood 5267,281 
   F-statistic 301,8981 
 
218,5941 
 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
 
0 
 
    Mean dependent var 0,129916 
 
0,039215 0,129916 
    S.D. dependent var 0,213554 
 
0,093191 
 
    Akaike info criterion -0,482176 
       Schwarz criterion -0,474836 
       Hannan-Quinn criter. -0,479784 
       Durbin-Watson stat 0,327821  1,202124 0,303078 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Capital structure theories play an important role for corporate finance and 
corporate governance. Capital structure and its determinants has for decades been 
a popular field for researchers, where conflict of interest between different groups 
related to the firm, as well as the ownership structure have been proven to be 
significant determinants. The classical tradeoff theory has been advanced to 
include these.  Motivated by the developments of capital structure theory, we will 
examine whether ownership structure and corporate governance is linked with 
capital structure of Norwegian private firms. 
 
Despite the extensively researched field of capital structure, we have a unique 
angel as we are permitted to access the CCGR database provided by the Centre for 
Corporate Governance Research. The database contains corporate governance 
data and accounting data for both private and public Norwegian firms. Since 
private firms are much less researched than public firms, we have the comparative 
advantage of exploring this field with the unique database. 
 
The rest of this preliminary is structured as follows; first a literature review which 
gives the main findings in context of optimal capital structure, agency theory, and 
ownership structure. It comprises of only the most relevant studies for the purpose 
of this thesis. Thereafter, the paper gives an explanation of the data in terms of 
sources and uniqueness. The scarcity of private firm analysis is also elaborated. 
Finally, the paper outlines the methodology and hypotheses. 
  
2.  Literature Review 
 
2.1 Capital Structure 
Ever since Modigliani and Miller (1958) argued that “The market value of any 
firm is independent of its capital structure and is given by capitalizing its expected 
return at the rate appropriate to its (risk) class”, there has been particular interests 
for researching the importance of capital structure. In essence, Modigliani and 
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Miller proposed that capital structure was irrelevant for the value of the firm. This 
has become known as M&M proposition I. It builds on rather rigid assumptions 
that are not compatible with the real world. Due to the unrealistic nature of these 
assumptions, they created the stepping-stone for future advances in this field. 
M&M´s view on “optimal” capital structure changed when they relaxed the 
assumption of no taxes. They relaxed this assumption in their 1963 paper and 
found that firm value was maximized when entirely financed with debt. This was 
due to the tax advantage of debt, known as tax shield. However, they did not 
include important factors such as; agency costs, bankruptcy costs or personal 
taxes. 
 
Miller (1977) included personal taxes into the analysis of capital structure. His 
main result was that optimal debt ratio might vary from 0-100% depending on 
personal and corporate tax rates (Swanson, 2003). Taxes are not significant 
enough to account for the capital structure to have 100% debt. 
 
The tradeoff theory of capital structure takes into account bankruptcy cost of debt. 
Kraus and Litzenberg (1973) propose it to be a balance between the deadweight 
loss of bankruptcy and the tax shield benefit of debt. When debt to equity ratio 
increase, marginal benefit of tax and  marginal cost of bankruptcy should get to an 
optimal point. 
 
The tradeoff theory proposed by Kraus and Litzenberg is the classical version, 
while it has later been extended. Tax benefits are not so prevalent, while agency 
costs and asymmetric information has been included as costs and benefits to debt. 
2.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory dates back as far as the 18th century where Adam Smith in 1776 
expressed how one takes better care of one’s own money than anyone else’s 
money.  Jensen and Meckling formalized the actual principal-agent theory in 
1976, and their theory became the foundation for modern agency theory within the 
organization (Goergen, 2012). 
 
Separation of ownership and control within firms is the seed of agency costs. 
Berle and Means outlined this in 1932 in their book “The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property”. Agency costs consist of three components; monitoring 
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costs, bonding costs, and residual loss. Monitoring is observing agents behavior, 
but also taking action to limit or avoid unwanted behavior. Bonding costs is borne 
by the agent; it acts as a signal to the principal that the agent will in fact act in 
their best interest. The principal incurs the residual loss because the agent may not 
invest in a way that maximizes the principal’s wealth (Goergen, 2012). 
 
The free cash flow problem introduced by Jensen in 1986 was very fundamental 
to the understanding of how managers were enabled to deviate from maximizing 
shareholders wealth. Jensen states that free cash flow is the number one financing 
source of agency problems. He also argues that in larger mature firms the free 
cash flow problem will heighten the difficulties created by moral hazard. The 
larger the firm, the more complex and perhaps less transparent it is. Private firms 
are less transparent and may therefore have the same degree of agency issues as 
large public firms. 
 
Jensen and Meckling argue that there should be an optimal combination of debt 
and equity to minimize agency problems and thus also maximize firm value. 
2.3 Ownership Concentration 
There are at least four methods of measuring concentration of ownership; per 
owner: the fraction held by a given owner with rank n (e.g. third largest owns 
10%), or by subgroup of owners: fraction held by the largest plus n (e.g. the two 
largest hold 70%), Herfindahl Index (take all ownership fractions and square 
them, then add them together, it ranges from 0-1), or simply the number of owners 
(the firm has 200 owners) (Bøhren, 2012). 
 
The benefits of high ownership concentration for private firms are closer 
monitoring and less free riding. According to Jensen-Meckling (1976) and 
Demsetz-Lehn (1985) monitoring increases when the owners are more 
concentrated. They are incentivised by higher gains from higher firm value when 
owning more. Additionally, their impact of voting on the annual general meeting 
(AGM) is increasing with ownership fraction, giving higher power to shareholders 
with more shares. According to Shleifer-Vishny (1986) there will be less free 
riding when ownership concentration is high - active governance will give less 
benefits to passive owners. There is a fixed cost of being active and the benefits of 
being active increases with ownership share, therefore when ownership 
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concentration is dispersed it will lead to the collective action problem in corporate 
governance.  
The costs of high concentration are diversification loss, majority-minority 
conflicts, and problems with incompetent owners (common for second-generation 
family firms). Diversification loss is a consequence arising from a situation when 
investing most of the wealth in one firm, becoming more dependent of the firm to 
do well. Private firms do not provide much liquidity and diversification loss and 
inflexibility is therefore more severe for private firms (Demsetz-Lehn, 1985). 
Majority-minority conflicts between owners arise when powerful owners over 
consume, overinvest, and create private benefits through tunnelling mechanism 
(Johnson et al., 2000). High concentration gives high power to the largest owners 
and they may not be suited or competent to make decisions that are best for the 
firm (Burkart et al., 1997). 
3.  Data 
Public firms are widely used for an astonishing amount of articles, but very few 
have analyzed private firms from a corporate finance and corporate governance 
perspective. However, private firms constitute the largest part of the economy 
(Bøhren, 2012). One can say that it is a strong bias that private firms have been 
ignored in empirical research in finance and governance. According to Becht et al. 
(2003) and Eckbo (2008), practically every empirical paper in finance studies the 
public firm.  Some exceptions exist: Giannette (2003), Claessens-tzioumis (2006), 
Klapper et al. (2006), Bennedsen et al. (2007) and Giannetti-Ongena (2008). Also, 
family firms have been studied for years, but not in a public versus private 
perspective (Bøhren, 2012).  
 
Considering the fact that a majority of firms are private, one would expect them to 
be at least as analyzed as public firms. Due to regulations, private firms are not 
obligated to provide all of the same information as public firms, and it is therefore 
much more difficult to obtain data for private firms. However, Scandinavia keep 
quite good records of private firms making it possible to do research on these. One 
implication however, when analyzing private firms   we will use book values only 
as there are no market prices available. 
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The Centre for Corporate Governance Research will provide us with access to 
data from the CCGR database. This is a unique database containing corporate 
governance related data and accounting data for private Norwegian firms. We 
might also use the Zebra database provided by Norges Bank. It contains, among 
other data, the loan level of Norwegian firms.  
 
Most private firms are small in size, 90% have less than 20 employees.  Large 
public firms are much larger than large private firms, however a large firm is more 
often private. According to Bøhren (2012) private firms have in general more debt 
than public firms, 75% compared to 47%. In his research, Bøhren also used the 
CCGR database. 
The period that will be analyzed is 2006-2011. Because of the 2006 tax reform, 
that changed our dataset substantially, we start with the accounting year of 2006. 
After 2006 there was double taxation of dividends and it induced higher debt and 
lower dividends which would cause a structural break in the dataset. The data is 
cross-sectional and our results will not be affected by the limited number of years. 
 
We can use either the raw leverage numbers or industry-adjusted ones. 
Proxy for growth opportunities (GO) and proxy for leverage: 
 
Growth opportunity proxy; 
 Sales to assets 
 
Leverage proxy; 
 Short and long-term debt as a share of total assets 
 
Ownership proxies; 
 Share of largest owner 
 Share of the CEO 
 Number of shareholders 
 Share of largest family 
 
Firm performance proxies; 
 Return on assets (ROA) 
 Return on equity (ROE) 
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4.  Methodology and Hypotheses 
4.1 Methodology 
Eviews will be used when analyzing the data, for running regressions, making 
charts etc. The econometric method has not yet been established, however, we 
might use 2SLS to account for possible endogeneity. This method has some 
disadvantages to the standard OLS. We will therefore research the possible 
methods further. 
4.2 Possible Hypotheses 
Private firms rely heavily on debt financing. According to agency theory there is 
an advantage of debt to reduce the principal-agent problem between owners and 
managers. Leverage could be used to reduce managerial overinvestment, but if 
leverage is too high it can lead to debt overhang. As a result we expect leverage to 
be increasing in capital structure, which can vary across industries. 
 
To test this, we would split our sample into firms with majority shareholders and 
firms without a majority shareholder, firms with dispersed ownership, expecting 
the latter group to use leverage to control management. 
 
H1: firms with dispersed ownership have higher leverage than firms with a 
majority shareholder. 
 
A larger share may increase the power of the largest shareholder and enhance 
monitoring incentives. This may also align managers’ incentives with that of 
shareholders. We therefore propose two hypotheses that account for each of these 
predictions. 
 
H2a: in firms with dispersed ownership, leverage is decreasing in the share of the 
largest shareholder. 
 
H2b: in firms with dispersed ownership, leverage is decreasing in the ownership 
share of the CEO. 
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In hypothesis one we propose that with dispersed ownership leverage is higher, 
however, when firms with dispersed ownership have growth opportunities these 
will be taken advantage of and leverage will decrease. When measuring growth 
opportunities we cannot use Tobin's q as we are analyzing private firms.  Due to 
the lack of market values we use book values only. Growth opportunities can be 
measured as sales to assets or by using industry indicators. 
H3: in firms with dispersed ownership, leverage is decreasing in growth 
opportunities. 
 
When the largest owner is also the CEO, she will have greater power to keep 
leverage low in order to benefit from higher levels of free cash flow. In addition to 
the low transparency of private firms, this may incentivize the CEO to use his 
power to enjoy perquisites. 
 
H4: leverage is lower if the majority shareholder is also the CEO 
 
Jensen (1986) argued that free cash flow is the main financing source of agency 
problems. Higher free cash flow implies that management has more cash available 
for perquisites and overinvestment causing conflicts of interest between managers 
and owners. 
 
H5: Higher free cash flow decreases leverage when ownership concentration is 
high. 
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